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Foreword
History is myth based on consensus, say the cynics. The intent of
Congress in requiring an audit of annual financial statements by an
independent public accountant has achieved the status of myth, but
the consensus is lacking. The SEC and its staff have used the con
gressional decision to rely on independent auditors as evidence that
Congress expected the public accounting profession to function as an
arm of government. For example, it is contended that the independent
auditor should immediately report violations of law to federal au
thorities. After all, Congress rejected a corps of federal auditors and
federal licensing of auditors at the urging of independent auditors who
testified before it. Would Congress have expected less from independ
ent auditors than from government auditors?
Others have relied on the same evidence to support an opposite
view. By rejecting federal auditors, Congress must have been aware
that a confidential relationship between the auditor and management is
essential for an effective audit. If the independent auditor is trusted by
management, both can work together to achieve the best possible
financial presentation. Casting the auditor as an agent of government
would undermine the effectiveness of independent audits.
Faced with such contradictory interpretations, the Commission on
Auditors’ Responsibilities asked Professor Jeremy Wiesen to study the
legislative history of the securities acts and to extract the auditor’s
roles and responsibilities as they were envisioned by Congress. His
study should help to put to rest debates about the implications of the
decision to favor independent auditors over federal auditors and similar
discussions. However, no victor emerges in this particular argument
because both sides have overstated the significance of the decision.
At a time when many of the issues considered by Congress in 1933
and 1934 are again the subjects of congressional hearings, Professor
Wiesen’s investigation of earlier legislation should add valuable per
spective.
This is the second of four studies to be published from the back
ground research for the Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities. The
studies are not part of the commission’s report, but the commission
believes they contain useful material that warrants wide distribution.

Publication does not necessarily constitute endorsement or approval
by either the AICPA or the commission. Authors of research studies are
responsible for the content and recommendations.
Lee J. Seidler
Deputy Chairman
Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities
D. R. Carmichael
Research Director
Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities
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Preface
In November, 1977, the Senate Subcommittee on Reports, Account
ing and Management (Metcalf Committee) wrote: “ Prior to this subcom
mittee’s inquiry, Congress had not made a thorough study of the
independent auditing system established under the provisions of the
Federal securities laws since they were enacted more than 40 years
ago.” The congressional consideration of auditors’ duties in 1933-1934
is the subject of this monograph.
The nature and extent of the congressional consideration of audit
ing at the enactment of the securities acts should be considered by
courts and the SEC when they apply the acts to auditors, and it should
be examined by Congress before it adopts new legislation affecting
auditors. The Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities was particularly
interested in the subject as it related to the auditor’s role in society.
I
was greatly assisted on preliminary drafts of this study by the
following members and staff of the Commission on Auditors’ Respon
sibilities: Manuel F. Cohen, chairman until his death in June, 1977; Lee
J. Seidler, deputy chairman; Henry R. Jaenicke, principal research
consultant; Douglas R. Carmichael, research director; and, Patricia
McConnell, project coordinator. Three accounting historians, Richard
Brief and Barbara Merino of New York University, and Stephen A. Zeff
of Rice University, provided helpful insights into the state of auditing in
the 1930s. Conscientious research of legislative history was performed
by three New York University research assistants: Stewart S. Karlinsky,
Susan D. Lewis, and Floyd Tupper.
The text and footnotes of the final draft of this study were exten
sively edited for publication.
Special recognition must be given to the considerable efforts con
tributed by Richard Eng, a CPA and JD/MBA candidate at New York
University, and my current research assistant. His auditing experience,
meticulous research, and skillful draftsmanship were indispensable to
the study’s publication.
Jeremy Wiesen
New York, New York
March, 1978
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Introduction
Issues Presented
The principal purpose of this study is to examine the nature and
extent of the responsibilities that Congress intended auditors to as
sume at the time of enactment of the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 act)
and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 act, and with the 1933
act, referred to herein as “the securities acts” ). This subject is part of
the broader topic of the independent auditor’s role in society, which
has been studied by the Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities
(CAR) and is discussed in section 1 of its Report, Conclusions, and
Recommendations.
Chapter 1 describes the significant lack of specific congressional
intent regarding auditors’ duties in 1933 and 1934. Chapters 2 and 3
discuss congressional intent that did exist at that time regarding audi
tors. The Conclusion discusses the impact which congressional expec
tations ought to have on auditors’ duties under the securities acts.
Dr. Henry R. Jaenicke prepared a study for CAR in which he
thoroughly discusses common law and statutes affecting auditors, in
cluding the principal provisions and court interpretations of the se
curities acts.1 The matter of auditors’ legal liability is closely related to
their professional responsibilities, the subject of this paper. Note the
following statement by one of the principal draftsmen of the 1933 act,
William O. Douglas, in a coauthored article which describes the in
creased legal responsibilities of auditors under the 1933 act:
To say the least the [1933] A ct goes as far in protection of purchasers of
securities as the plaintiff in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche unsuccessfully
urged on the New York Court of Appeals to go in the protection of a
creditor. The change which the court thought so “ revolutionary” as to be
“ w rought by legislation” has been made. And the duty placed on experts
such as accountants has not been measured by the e xp e rt’s relations to
his em ployer but by his service to investors.2

1.
2.

H. R. Jaenicke, The Effect of Litigation on Independent Auditors, CAR Research
Study No. 1, (New York: AICPA, 1977).
Douglas and Bates, “The Federal Securities Act of 1933,” Yale Law Journal 43
(1933): 198. Douglas and Bates used the terms accountant and auditor inter
changeably. This was a prevalent practice at the time the article was written.
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Douglas and Bates point out in a subsequent part of the article that
Congress did not “ measure” the specific obligations of auditors in the
language of the securities acts.3 Courts and, in turn, the SEC and the
regulated community of auditors should be concerned with the legisla
tive intent (or purpose) behind the, statutory provisions. In fact, the
legislative history could be consulted even if the references and man
dates to auditors in the securities acts were clear and unambiguous:
It is often said that extrinsic aids may be considered only when a statute is
am biguous and not where the language is clear. But am biguity is not
uniformly insisted on as a prerequisite to the use of aids to construction.
Thus it has been said that “ Usually a court looks into the legislative history
to clear up some statutory am biguity . . . but such am biguity is not the sine
qua non for a judicial inquiry into legislative history,” and that the “ plain
meaning rule . . . is not to be used to thwart or distort the intent of
Congress by excluding from consideration enlightening materials from the
legislative files.” 4

Two of the principal draftsmen of the securities acts, James Landis
and Felix Frankfurter, advocated searching analyses of the history and
purposes of legislation. Landis, in an article written prior to the enact
ment of the securities acts, stated: “ Legislative history . . . affords in
many instances accurate and compelling guides to legislative mean
ing.” 5 Frankfurter, thirteen years after the enactment of the securities
acts, made the same point:
To be sure, laws can m easurably be improved with im provement in the
m echanics of legislation, and the need for interpretation is usually in
inverse ratio to the care and imagination of draftsmen. . . .
. . . Laws are not abstract propositions. They are expressions of policy
arising out of specific situations and addressed to the attainment of par
ticular ends.6

Methodology: Interpreting Legislative Intent
Legislative interpretation begins with an analysis of the meaning of
the words of the statute, using various rules on interpretation that the
courts have developed. An analysis of the language in the securities
acts reveals little concerning the duties of auditors as shown in Dr.
Jaenicke’s research study. Further investigation requires study of vari
ous materials which courts term “extrinsic aids.”
3.
4.
5.
6.

2

See chap. 1, n. 55 and chap. 3, n. 7.
J. Sutherland, Statutes and Statutory Construction, 4th ed., vol. 2A (Chicago: Calla
ghan and Co., 1972), sec. 48.01.
Landis, “A Note on ‘Statutory Interpretation’,” Harvard Law Review 43 (1930): 889.
Frankfurter, “Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes,” Columbia Law Review
47 (1947): 528 and 533.

Sutherland, in his treatise on statutory interpretation, groups extrin
sic aids into three chronological categories:
(a) pre-enactm ent history, i.e., pertinent circum stances and events leading
up to the introduction of the bill in the legislature, (b) enactm ent history,
covering all actions taken during legislative consideration of the bill, includ
ing statements about it, and (c) post-enactm ent history.7

Enactment history often provides the greatest resources for de
ciphering legislative intent. These materials include reports of legisla
tive committees, transcripts of committee hearings and legislative
debates, reports of committees and commissions outside the legisla
ture, executive messages, and the views of draftsmen. Some are
considered to be more authoritative than others. For example, congres
sional reports are said to have the greatest authority, while legislative
debates, the least, since debates may only show individual views and
motives. This study can not make such fine distinctions because of the
lack of significant information in the more important resources. There
fore, legislative hearings have been generously cited, and the views
expressed by influential congressmen have sometimes been ascribed
to Congress itself.
Social and economic conditions are informative sources of pre
enactment history. Sutherland states:
The events occurring im mediately prior to the time when an act becomes
law com prise a most instructive source for information indicative of what
the legislature intended it to mean. . . . [The history of events] consists
chiefly in statements by various parties as to the nature and effect of the
proposed law and statements or other evidence as to evils requiring
legislative relief. Contemporary history also includes information concerning
the activities of pressure groups, econom ic conditions in the country . . . ,
prevailing business practices, and the prior state of the law. . . ,8

Such materials are useful in the analysis of congressional intent re
garding auditors’ duties because of the paucity of the important types
of enactment history resources.
Post-enactment history includes an analysis of legislative inaction.
There is disagreement about its significance:
A number of decisions have held that the acquiescence of the legislature
through inaction following a contem poraneous and practical interpretation
is evidence that the legislature intends to adopt such interpretation. But
legislative inaction has also been called a "weak reed upon which to lean"
and a “ poor beacon” to follow in construing a statute.9

7.
8.
9.

J. Sutherland, Statutes and Statutory Construction, vol. 2A, secs. 48.04-48.18.
Ibid., sec. 48.04.
Ibid., sec. 49.10.
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In the case of legislation that creates a regulatory agency (such as the
SEC), interpretations by the agency of the statute are afforded some
weight if not objected to by the legislature:
Interpretive regulations by officers, administrative agencies, departmental
heads and others officially charged with the duty of adm inistering and
enforcing a statute, and their practices which reflect the understanding
they have of provisions they are charged to carry out, have great weight in
determining the operation of a statute.10

The limits of this proposition are discussed in the Conclusion.

10. Ibid., sec. 49.05.
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1
The Lack of Congressional
Intent Regarding Auditors
Congressional Consideration of the Securities Acts
Landis provided the following description of Frankfurter’s request
for help in drafting the bill that became the 1933 act:
It was a Thursday in early April and my next classes [as Professor of
Legislation at Harvard Law School] were scheduled for the following Mon
day. Frankfurter, however, thought that the job could be done over that
weekend. We consequently left on the night train for W ashington. . . .
. . . After a brief session with Frankfurter, where we determ ined to take as
the base of our work the English [British] Companies Act with which
[Benjam in] Cohen was very familiar, Cohen, Corcoran and I set to work. . . .
By late Saturday night we had a draft of the bill in reasonable shape.1

This vignette is a colorful depiction of what one researcher called the
“ atmosphere of crisis” 2 in which the 1933 act was created. Such
descriptions are somewhat hyperbolic, however, as Landis states in
the quote concluding this chapter.
In the first place, Congress had considered securities legislation
prior to 1933-4. In 1919 Representative Taylor of Colorado introduced a
bill fashioned from the British Companies Act, and in 1920, the Vol

1.
2.

Landis, “The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933,” George Washington
Law Review 28 (1959): 33-34.
R. Chatov, “The Collapse of Corporate Financial Standards Regulations: A Study of
SEC-Accountant Interaction” (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley,
1973), p. 157. The dissertation, in a slightly edited form, has been published under
the title Corporate Financial Reporting: Public or Private Control, (New York: Free
Press, 1975).
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stead Bill was introduced, modeled after New York State’s Martin Fraud
Act; both bills died in committee.3 In 1922, Representative Denison of
Illinois introduced a bill to prevent fraud in the sale of securities
through the mails or agencies of interstate commerce. This bill fared
better than the Taylor bill, but it never passed the Senate. Subse
quently, a similar bill was introduced by Representative Sabath, and
the Denison bill was reintroduced (as the LaGuardia bill), but both
were dead issues by 1933. In addition, there was the Uniform Sales of
Securities Act, drafted by thirty-eight state securities commissioners.
Huston Thompson, a lawyer for the American Institute of Accountants
and one of the drafters of the 1933 act, provided the following insight
about the proposed 1933 act at the 1933 Senate hearings: “We have
taken [the registration] requirements from the Uniform Sales of Se
curities Act, and also from the Taylor bill.’’4
In the second place, the congressional testimony, submissions of
statements, and committee reports that accompany the securities acts
fill an eleven-volume set.5 Although specific conclusions cannot be
drawn from the fact that this congressional “ record” would probably
outweigh the written record of many other pieces of legislation, the fact
that the record is not insubstantial is some evidence of congressional
diligence.
In the third place, the design of the securities acts made them
more than temporary regulation. This is true of the contemporaneous
legislation in the 1930s that created the Federal Communications Com
mission (1934), the Tennessee Valley Authority (1934), the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (1933), and the Social Security Adminis
tration (1935). The securities acts are unlike other New Deal programs
that were merely continuations of the anti-Depression policies created
during the Hoover administration.6 Finally, Congress employed very
skilled lawyers to draft the securities acts.
On the other hand, justifiable criticism of the securities acts sup
ports the proposition that they were not a result of diligent congres
sional consideration. Securities lawyers have noted the deficiencies in

3.

4.
5.
6.

6

E. T. McCormick, Understanding the Securities Act and the S.E.C., (New York:
American Book Co., 1948), p. 15; and the statement of Huston Thompson, U.S.,
Congress, Senate, Committee on Banking and Currency, Hearings on S. 875, 73d
Cong., 1st sess. (1933), pp. 69-74 [hereinafter cited as 1933 Senate Hearings].
1933 Senate Hearings, p. 96. However, the 1933 act adopted a policy of disclosure,
whereas the state laws granted the government substantial powers to pass on the
merits of securities offerings.
J. S. Ellenberger and E. P. Mahar, Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933
and Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (S. Hackensack, N.J.: Fred B. Rothman & Co.,
1973).
See P. Studenski and H. E. Kroos, Financial History of the United States (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1952), p. 382.

a scheme which has one statute that heavily regulates disclosure when
securities are issued (the 1933 act) and another statute, almost totally
unconnected, that regulates the disclosure of information by public
companies (the 1934 act).7 As a result of recommendations in the
SEC’s “ Wheat Report,” the SEC has reduced certain disclosure re
quirements under the 1933 act while increasing 1934 act obligations.8
In 1978, Congress will be asked to consider adoption of the American
Law Institute’s Federal Securities Code, which would, in effect, inte
grate the securities acts. The flexibility of the acts, as demonstrated by
the SEC’s recent shift in emphasis, is also a factor that indicates the
absence of strong, original congressional intent.
Securities analysts and economists have also criticized the se
curities acts: They complain of the uselessness of some of the informa
tion the SEC requires to be disclosed and of the SEC’s prohibition
against disclosure of more relevant information. This criticism led to the
formation in 1976 of the SEC’s Advisory Committee on Corporate Dis
closures, which recently issued its report.
Congressional committees were informed in 1933 and 1934 that
historical cost information might not be very useful to investors,9 but
Congress did not attempt to understand the problem in depth nor try to
solve it. Professor Homer Kripke has suggested a reason for this
indifference in 1933-4: "There is no history showing that the persons
responsible for the draftsmanship of the Securities Act of 1933 were
experienced in securities selection or in the securities markets. . . .” 10
Even the less subtle topic of the investor’s need for earnings state
ments for three years, rather than earnings statements for just one
year, had to be explained at the 1933 Senate hearings by a prominent
accountant, but the senators were not overwhelmed by the account
ant’s insight, as is described later in this chapter.11

7. The principal activating force for this criticism was an article by Milton Cohen,
“ ‘Truth in Securities' Revisited,” Harvard Law Review 79 (1966): 1340. It should be
noted that in his 1933 message to Congress regarding the 1933 act, President
Roosevelt referred to his plans for a second securities act dealing with "all property
dealt in on exchanges.” H. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st sess. (1933).
8. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Disclosure to Investors-A Reappraisal of
Federal Administrative Policies Under the '33 and '34 Acts (New York: Commerce
Clearing House, 1969).
9. See chap. 2, n. 23.
10. H. Kripke, "An Unusual Opportunity for Rethinking Concepts on a Fundamental
Level,” New York Law Journal, December 13, 1976, p. 27, col. 2. For another
description of the work of economists in this area, and its impact on the work of the
SEC, see an address by Commissioner Sommer titled “Required Disclosure in the
Stock Market: The Other Side," September 27, 1973, in Wiesen, Regulating Trans
actions in Securities (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1975), p. 311.
11. 1933 Senate Hearings, pp. 55-67.
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Congressional Consideration of the Role of Auditors
Under the Securities Acts
The testimony of Colonel Carter, president of the New York State
Society of Certified Public Accountants, before the Senate Banking and
Currency Committee in 1933 was of great importance to public audi
tors.12 He influenced Congress to abandon the idea of government
auditors in favor of auditing by the private sector’s “ public” auditors.
The SEC, in an accounting series release (ASR), referred to Carter’s
role at the hearings as that of “ a representative of the accounting
profession,” and stated that the Senate committee revised the bill in
accordance with Carter’s “ suggestions.” 13 In fact, the SEC implied that
the committee was convinced by Carter’s persuasion, and persons
generally recall the episode in that way.
In that ASR the SEC characterized Carter’s testimony at the 1933
Senate hearings as part of a thorough investigation by the Senate
committee of what the role of the auditor under the 1933 act would be:
The Committee considered at length the value to investors and to the
public of an audit by accountants not connected with the com pany or
management and whether the additional expense to industry of an audit by
independent accountants was justified by the expected benefits to the
public. The Committee also considered the advisability and feasibility of
requiring the audit to be made by accountants on the staff of the agency
administering the A ct.14

This statement belies that Senate committee’s lack of knowledge of,
and its disinterest in, the work of auditors.
Carter’s testimony significantly influenced the Senate committee to
change a major provision of the 1933 act, from requiring issuers of
securities to be audited by government auditors to requiring those
audits to be done by the private sector. That decision was made quite
easily because the committee had not thoroughly explored the me
chanics of the proposed government audit process, it did not possess
a basic knowledge of public auditing, nor did it have a sophisticated
understanding of the purposes of financial statements as displayed by
Carter’s discussions on the need for three-year comparative financial
statements.
The testimony that most pointedly displays the committee’s lack of
knowledge about auditors’ work is the following:
S enator G ore : H ow many public accountants do you think would be
available for this service?

12. Ibid.
13. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Independence of Certifying Accountants,
ASR no. 81 (December 11, 1958), p. 1.
14. Ibid.
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M r. Carter: There are approxim ately 15,000 certified public account
ants in the United States today qualified under the laws of the various
States:
S enator Barkley : How many in your organization?
M r . C arter: Two thousand.
Senator Barkley : Is there any relationship between your organization
with 2,000 m em bers and the organization of controllers represented here
yesterday with 2,000 members?
M r. Carter: None at all. We audit the controllers.
S enator Barkley : You audit the controllers?
M r. Carter : Yes; the public accountant audits the controller’s account.
S enator Barkley : Who audits you?
M r. Carter : Our conscience.
Senator Barkley : I am wondering whether after all a controller is not
for all practical purposes the same as an auditor, and must he not know
something about auditing?
M r. Carter : He is in the employ of the com pany. He is subject to the
orders of his superiors.
Senator Barkley : I understand. But he has got to know something
about auditing?
M r. Carter: Yes.
S enator Barkley : He has got to know something about bookkeeping?
M r. Carter : But he is not independent.
S enator Reynolds : Let me ask you this question, Colonel. These com 
panies are going to arrive at these figures through their special auditors.
All right. Now you want the m em bers of your organization to check up on
their figures?
M r . Carter: A s we do in many cases of industrial com panies every
year.15

Further questioning of Carter showed that some of the committee
members were not absorbing all of his testimony. The committee had
to be informed twice that 85 percent of New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE) companies had independent audits.16 After the testimony
quoted above, committee members repeated questions they had pre
viously asked about the British Companies A ct17 and the nature of the
auditor's opinion in the United States.18
At the 1933 Senate hearings the committee also displayed a lack of
patience with the subject of auditing. At one point the committee was
engaged in a meaningful discussion of the purpose of having an
independent audit, but the committee chairman stated: “ Let us pro
ceed, Colonel Carter. We would like to get through with this.” 19 Carter’s
testimony had at that point filled less than eight large-type pages, but
had begun to develop very practical proposals about financial state
ments and a discussion of the purposes of the bill. Carter obeyed the
chairman’s directive: After one more page of testimony on the efficacy
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

1933
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Ibid.,

Senate Hearings, p. 58.
pp. 56, 60.
pp. 57, 61-62.
pp. 56-57, 59-60.
p. 62.
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of financial statements, Carter left the topic and concluded his testi
mony with a discussion of securities salesmen’s commissions.
The choice of that subject, to which Carter was directed by the
committee, may be also indicative of the reason so little attention was
placed on the work of auditors. Congress may have been more con
cerned with the institutions directly involved with the functioning of the
securities markets than it was in the quality of corporate disclosures.
This relative degree of concern was displayed at another session of
the 1933 Senate hearings, at which some senators had difficulty under
standing why the 1933 act was so unrelated to stock exchange trans
actions.20
At the 1934 Senate hearings, on the topic of the qualifications of
auditors, Robert E. Healy, chief counsel of the Federal Trade Commis
sion (FTC), testified that he “ hope[d] the day [would] come” when
accountants would be more strongly regulated by the federal govern
ment. Senator Kean asked emphatically whether accountants ought to
be licensed by the federal government. Healy began his brief answer
by reminding the committee that he had already answered the ques
tion, but "some of the committee were busy with something else.” He
stated that it might be a good idea, and along with it, accountants
should perhaps report to shareholders, rather than to directors, all of
which might give accountants "a dignified position of responsibility
under Federal laws.” Healy, in an attempt to provoke a response,
suggested that the answer would be a matter of public and congres
sional “ sentiment.” The chairman responded: “ We have enough to deal
with now without going into outside questions. The complaint about this
bill is that it goes too far.” 21
It is not too surprising that congressional consideration of auditing
and auditors was not extensive concerning the 1934 act and the 1934
amendments to the 1933 act. Congressional interest in the subject may
have been dissipated when the 1933 act made accountants a specific
target of liability and set the standard at mere negligence, as dis
cussed below.
At the 1934 Senate hearings some congressmen showed that they
had not absorbed the prior year’s testimony. For example, on the
subject of audit costs, Senator Kean asked the same questions in 1934
as he had asked in 1933; however, he did not question George O.
May, a prominent spokesman for the accounting profession, in 1934
why his answer differed significantly from Colonel Carter’s testimony in
1933.22

20. Ibid., pp. 72-74.
21. U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Banking and Currency, Hearings on S. Res.
84, and S. Res. 56, and S. Res. 97, 73d Cong., 2d sess. (1934), p. 7616 [hereinafter
cited as 1934 Senate Hearings].
22. Compare 1933 Senate Hearings, p. 60, with 1934 Senate Hearings, p. 7182.
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The failure of Congress to be more informed about auditing might
be attributed, in part, to the absence of a unified national organization
of accountants. In 1933-4 there were two opposing professional
groups, the American Society of Certified Public Accountants and the
American Institute of Accountants (the AIA, now the AICPA). A weak
institutional framework resulted from the competition between them.23
However, the profession was represented by leading persons who
submitted statements to, or testified before, Congress, including Colo
nel Carter, representing the New York State Society of Certified Public
Accountants; George O. May, on behalf of the AlA’s Special Commit
tee on Cooperation with Stock Exchanges; and John L. Carey, who
was secretary of the AIA.24
Congress could have been more informed on auditing by carefully
studying national bank and railroad audits, and by studying auditingrelated literature. The information which was available on auditing in
1933-4 is described below. Furthermore, congressional committees
could have examined various proposals that had been previously
made in Congress regarding the federal licensing of auditors (de
scribed in chapter 3).

Regulation by Disclosure
The securities acts, especially the 1933 act, represent a grand
attempt at regulation by disclosure rather than by prohibition. As de
scribed above, Congress was familiar with state “ Blue Sky” laws which
prohibited the sale of securities deemed to be unfair by an executive
of the state government.
Congress appears to have been more conscious of choosing reg
ulation by disclosure in 1933-4 than in the 1960s and 1970s when it has
adopted disclosure as the method to regulate many types of business
activities and conduct. A recent congressional bill, which became the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, was said to employ a novel
regulatory approach because it prohibited certain activities rather than
merely requiring them to be disclosed. The staff of the Senate Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs Committee stated in the report accompany
ing the bill that they “carefully weighed” the arguments on both sides
of “ prohibition vs. disclosure.” 25

23. The "feud,” and its effects, are described throughout Chatov, “ Corporate Financial
Standards Regulations.”
24. The testimony of Carter and May is documented extensively in this paper. Carey’s
statement is included in U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Interstate and For
eign Commerce, Hearings on H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720, 73d Cong., 2d sess. (1934),
pp. 652-654.
25. See U.S., Congress, Senate, Congressional Record 122 (1976): 6977, regarding S.
3418, 94th Cong., 2d sess. (1976).
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Congress rejected two direct methods of regulating auditing— em
ployment of federal auditors and federal licensing of auditors.
However, as discussed in chapter 2, Congress did not consider them
extensively. Considered even more briefly was regulating “ . . . how
[companies should] keep their books,” 26 even though Congress had in
fact authorized such close regulation of utilities and railroads prior to
1933.27 In both of the securities acts, Congress delegated significant
authority over auditors and auditing to the administrative agency that
would supervise the act.

The State of Auditing in 1933-4
Independent auditing was in a period of transition in the early
1930s, moving from relative unimportance and comparatively few writ
ten rules, to becoming a requirement for public companies and a
profession with some significant written guidelines. This development
of auditing appears to have been more a result of the efforts of the
NYSE, which began most earnestly in 1932, than the enactment of the
securities acts, as described by SEC Commissioner Sommer in a 1974
speech:
We are now in the midst of the third formal effort to develop in a systematic
fashion a body of accounting principles. Prior to the com m encem ent of the
first such formal effort, there had been considerable discussion of the
desirability of developing some systemization of accounting principles and
auditing practices. This manifested itself in somewhat fragm entary fashion
in bulletins issued by the Federal Reserve Bank in 1917 and 1929. Largely
under the leadership of George O. May, then the managing partner of
Price, Waterhouse & Co., liaison was established between the principal
accounting organization and the New York Stock Exchange, the principal
securities market in the United States, looking toward the developm ent of
accounting and auditing standards for com panies listed on that Exchange.
This eventuated in 1934 in a docum ent entitled Audits o f Corporate A c
counts which unquestionably had profound im pact upon the developm ent
of accounting principles. Given its origin, of course, this publication was
strongly shareholder oriented. Am ong other things, this introduced the
terms "accepted principles of a cco u n tin g ” and “ accounting principles,”
established a standard form of auditing report and incorporated in it the
term "present fairly” and eliminated the words “ we certify” in favor of “ in
our opinion.”28

26. 1933 Senate Hearings, p. 219 (discussion between Senator Byrnes and Mr. Healy;
quoted statement is by the latter).
27. W. A. Staub, Auditing Developments During the Present Century (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1942), pp. 15-25.
28. “The American Experience with Accounting Principles,” address by Commissioner
A. A. Sommer, London, England, Dec. 11, 1974 (Washington, D.C.: Securities and
Exchange Commission), pp. 1-2. The third effort to establish accounting principles
referred to in the quote is the formation of the Financial Accounting Standards Board
(FASB). Note that for the purposes of this paper Sommer is referring to auditing
standards as much as to accounting principles. As described elsewhere, the FRB
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The fact that accounting and auditing were in a state of change in
1933-4 makes it difficult to gauge congressional intent on the topic and
suggests that Congress may have had difficulty focusing on this mov
ing subject.
At the 1933 Senate hearings Colonel Carter depicted independent
auditing as a profession that was ubiquitous, but, as noted above,
congressmen seemed to have little understanding of the subject.
Healy, who as chief counsel at the FTC was to have an important role
in administering the 1933 act, revealed to Congress, without apology,
his lack of knowledge of auditing:
T he C hairman : N ow , Judge Healy, suppose an independent auditing
concern, a certified public accountant, were to submit to you a statement
regarding one of these concerns that was applying for registration for the
purpose of selling their securities, would that accounting concern take the
books of the corporation, without going into the question of the value or
the write-up or anything of that sort. W ould they just confine themselves to
the books of the com pany in making their statement?
M r . H ealy: It is very difficult for me to answer that question, of course,
because I do not know what they do.29

Nine leading accounting firms, in a letter to the NYSE in 1933, implied
that little was known about auditing:
We fully recognize the im portance of defining the responsibility of
auditors and of bringing about a proper understanding on the part of the
investing public of the scope and significance of financial audits, to the
end that their im portance should not be underrated nor their protective
value exaggerated in the minds of investors.30

This was a convenient argument to present to Congress in 1933-4
as a reason for not imposing great liability on auditors. However, such
disparagement of auditing was considered necessary by some ac
countants because other contemporaries described auditing as a pre
cise science, as is discussed in chapter 2. Of course, the public still
has significant misconceptions about auditing.31
There is some evidence that in 1933-4 auditing was in a more
highly developed state, and more was known about it, than the forego
ing information reveals. This can be seen in W. A. Staub’s [managing

bulletin, Verification of Financial Statements ‘(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1929), and the pamphlet Audits of Corporate Accounts (New York:
AIA, 1934), were concerned with the rules of auditing.
29. 1933 Senate Hearings, p. 218.
30. This letter was printed in American Institute of Accountants, Audits of Corporate
Accounts, which also contains the correspondence between the AlA's Special Com
mittee on Cooperation with Stock Exchanges and the NYSE’s Committee on Stock
List from 1932-1934.
31. For example, the Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities found that many financial
statement users have the erroneous conception “that the financial statements are the
representations of the auditor rather than of management.” CAR, Report of Tentative
Conclusions (New York: AICPA, 1977), p. 76.
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partner of Lybrand, Ross Bros. & Montgomery] description of the
standardization process that auditing was undergoing for NYSE-listed
companies before the NYSE-AIA collaboration began in 1932:
One of the most helpful influences in furthering the practice of having
published financial statements accompanied by certificates of independent
public accountants was that exerted by the New York Stock Exchange. As
the culmination of informal activity in this direction for some years, the
president of the Exchange on January 6, 1933, made an announcement
that since April of 1932 all corporations applying for listing of their se
curities had been asked to include in their listing agreements an undertak
ing that future annual financial statements, published more than three
months after the agreement, would be audited by independent public
accountants and accompanied by a certificate of such accountants, setting
forth the scope of the audit and qualifications, if any, made by them in
respect thereto, and that the Committee on Stock List had considered
many reasons advanced why this procedure should not apply in particular
cases but had made exceptions only in the case of certain railroad com
panies. . ..
Especially from the time that Mr. J. M. B. Hoxsey became executive
assistant to the Stock List Committee of the Exchange during the 1920's,
the Exchange had been doing its utmost to encourage the preparation of
financial statements published by listed corporations on the basis of sound
accounting principles. The support of the Exchange in this way, which
antedated the enactment of the securities acts, was most helpful to ac
countants in their efforts for improvement in corporate accounting practice.
The services of Mr. Hoxsey, representing the Exchange, in accounting
conferences with the officers of listed corporations, with the independent
accountants examining the statements of such corporations, and with the
Committee of the American Institute of Accountants on Cooperation with
Stock Exchanges, were of the greatest value in furthering the recognition
and adoption by corporations of sound accounting principles and the
improvement in form and content of published statements (emphasis sup
plied).32
Accounting historians provide additional reasons for characterizing
auditing as being in a relatively developed state in 1933-4.33 They cite
the quality of Robert H. Montgomery's formidable work Auditing Theory
and Practice, first published in 1912, and in its fourth edition by 1933.34
As further evidence that modern auditing was observable in the United
States at the beginning of the twentieth century, historians cite publica
tion in 1905 of Dicksee’s Auditing: A Practical Manual for Auditors
(edited by Montgomery).35
32. Staub, Auditing Developments, pp. 14-15. President Whitney’s announcement on
January 6, 1933, is contained in Audits of Corporate Accounts, p. 14.
33. In 1976 the author consulted Professors Richard Brief and Barbara Merino of the
Schools of Business, New York University, and Professor Steven A. Zeff of the
School of Business, Tulane University.
34. R. H. Montgomery, Auditing Theory and Practice (New York: Ronald Press, 1912).
The second edition was published in 1923 and the third in 1927.
35. L. R. Dicksee, Auditing: A Practical Manual for Auditors, First American Ed., edited
by R. H. Montgomery (New York: Ronald Press, 1905).
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It is difficult to reconcile the conflicting evidence about the state of
the art of auditing in 1933-4 because of the absence of significant
empirical evidence of what auditors were in fact doing. William Werntz,
chief accountant at the SEC in the 1930s, made the following observa
tion in 1939 about the difficulty in studying actual audit procedures:
In contrast to the time we [at the SEC] have spent on accounting princi
ples, there have been few cases before us involving the question of
whether a reasonable audit was made. This is perhaps due to lack of
information, in the normal case, as to the audit procedure followed. The
cases that do appear come to us after the horse had been spirited from
the barn. . . .36
Even though most auditors had probably studied Montgomery’s
auditing book, there is no evidence that accountants outside of
Montgomery’s firm were following it in practice. The framework of
auditing, as we know it, seems to have been present, but there was
apparently significant variability in its application from firm to firm.37
Barr and Koch, high-ranking accountants with the SEC, analyzed
the state of auditing in 1934 and reported that “ little authoritative
literature existed which clearly indicated the type of auditing pro
cedures normally employed by certifying accountants.” 38 Their article
cited the McKesson & Robbins case to support that observation. The
SEC found in that 1939 case that physical inspection of inventories,
and direct correspondence with debtors to confirm amounts reported
as accounts receivable, were generally recommended and frequently
employed, but they were not required procedures of the accounting
profession.39 Staub, in the 1940 Dickinson lectures at Harvard, stated:
“Although the confirmation practice was gradually coming into greater
use, it certainly could not be said up to 1939 that it was an essential
auditing procedure in the absence of which the auditor would not give
an unqualified certificate.”40
As described above, the existence of two competing professional
organizations of accountants in 1933-4 constituted a weak institutional
framework. This also may have contributed to a lag between auditing
theory and actual auditing practice. The absence of information about
auditing practices hindered the profession’s spokesmen before Con
36. W. W. Werntz, "What Is Expected of the Independent Auditor: From the viewpoint of
the Investor,” an address delivered at the annual meeting of the American Institute
of Accountants, September 21, 1939 (Washington, D.C.: Securities and Exchange
Commission), p. 2.
37. This was the consensus opinion of the three accounting historians referred to in n.
33 above.
38. Barr and Koch, "Accounting and the S.E.C.,” George Washington Law Review 28
(1959): 186. Andrew Barr was the chief accountant at the SEC for many years. Elmer
Koch was a financial accountant at the SEC at the time the article was written.
39. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, In the Matter of McKesson & Robbins,
ASR no. 19 (December 5, 1940), contained a summary of the SEC’s two-part report.
40. Staub, Auditing Developments, p. 52.

15

gress and was detrimental to the ability of Congress to have specific
expectations about auditor services.
Healy, speaking in 1937 as an SEC commissioner, reflected on the
state of accounting and auditing after the securities acts were
adopted:
I recall the advent of the Securities A ct of 1933, the Securities Exchange
A ct of 1934, the creation of the Securities and Exchange Commission in
1934, and the Public Utility Holding Company A ct in 1935. I recall the
writing of the forms and regulations for the registration of securities, the
disappointm ents attending our search for well established accounting
standards, the difficulty even of finding a definition for the word "audit,” the
weeks of argum ents as to what should be required in a form and what
omitted, the difficulty of deciding what an accountant's certificate ought to
contain, the cooperation and contributions of accountants, some with axes
to grind and others without (em phasis on portions directly related to audit
ing).41

Congressmen may have been in the same position as all U.S.
citizens: According to a 1932 Fortune article, certified public account
ants “walk in the shadow of virtual anonymity.” 42

Congressional Expectations Regarding the SEC and the
Accounting Profession
Congress may have adopted the securities acts without specific
expectations about auditor duties because it relied on the SEC (or the
FTC when it adopted the 1933 act) and the two professional associa
tions of accountants (even though they were feuding) to develop ac
counting and auditing requirements.
Landis, in a private communication, referred to the delegation of
authority to the SEC in the following way: “ We ought eventually to move
toward some uniformity in accounting, but it will be obviously a long
time before that can be done. . . .”43 Chatov’s research confirms this
statement, although he is more concerned with accounting principles
than with auditing standards:
What were the specific ideas in the m inds of the creators of the [securities]
Acts with respect to the treatm ent of accounting principles and setting up
the rules for financial reporting? . . . Benjamin Cohen’s [another of the a cts’
draftsm en] recollection of the event was that the ultimate idea was to get
power into the Commission.

41. R. E. Healy, "The Next Step in Accounting," an address delivered at the annual
meeting of the American Accounting Association (December 27, 1937), p. 2.
42. “ Certified Public Accountants,” Fortune 5 (1932): 63.
43. Letter from Landis to Renn, March 26, 1934, on file with the James M. Landis
Papers, Harvard Law Library.
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. . . Congress had
thority, rather than
im possible to fulfill,
a myth rather than

given the new Commission extensive rulemaking au
impose statutory requirements which would have been
since generally accepted principles of accounting were
a reality.44

This analysis is supported by a dialogue at the 1933 Senate hearings
between Huston Thompson and Senator Steiwer:
S enator Steiwer: . . . I have just provided myself with the listing re
quirements of the New York Stock Exchange, which I had not been familiar
with, and apparently, from a superficial reading of their listing require
ments, they are more far-reaching as to the information necessary to be
furnished than the bill now presented to this committee.
M r. Thompson : I might say that in a sense we were trying not to have
this bill too long. I think it is only about 30 pages, while the British
Companies A ct is over 300 pages. But we do have a provision in the bill
which permits the Commission to set up rules and regulations which will
have the effect of law. In those rules and regulations we expect them, in
drafting their forms, to go more into detail with regard to requirements.
Senator Steiwer: All rig h t45

The extent to which Congress delegated authority over auditing to
the SEC is a subject of some controversy.46 There is agreement that
the SEC has indirect control over auditing because of its authority to
(a) prescribe “ . . . the methods to be followed in the preparation of
accounts” ;47 (b ) prevent false or misleading statements;48 and (c) re
quire certain financial statements to be certified by independent public
or certified accountants.49
44. Chatov, Corporate Financial Standards Regulations, pp. 183-184.
45. 1933 Senate Hearings, p. 72.
46. In the first place, there is a difference of emphasis in the way commentators
approach the issue. Strother emphasizes that neither of the securities acts “express
ly authorize[s] the Commission to prescribe the standards by which an independent
public accountant is to conduct the examination underlying his report.” “The Estab
lishment of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles and Generally Accepted Au
diting Standards,” Vanderbilt Law Review 28 (1975): 224. The emphasis of
Carmichael and Willingham is on the SEC’s power: “The SEC has the authority to
make detailed prescriptions of accounting principles and auditing standards. . . .”
(D. R. Carmichael and J. J. Willingham, Auditing Concepts and Methods, 2d ed.
[New York: McGraw-Hill, 1975], p. 23). Secondly, it is presently unclear to what
extent rule 2(e) of the SEC rules of practice permits the SEC to disqualify from
appearing and practicing before it those accountants who do not possess the
requisite qualifications. The rule is being challenged in Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC,
76 Civ. 4489 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
47. Section 19(a), Securities Act of 1933 and section 13(b), Securities Exchange Act of
1934. These sections also permit the SEC to prescribe “the form . . . in which
required information shall be set forth” and “the items or details to be shown in the
balance sheet and earnings statement.. . . ”
48. The goal of full and fair disclosure is the crux of the 1933 act as stated in the act’s
preamble and is the leading object of the various antifraud provisions of both the
securities acts.
49. Securities Act of 1933, sched. A, items (25)-(26), and Securities Exchange Act of
1934, secs. 12(b)(1)(J)-(K), 13(a)(2). Other provisions of the acts appear to grant the
SEC the authority to define independence and to determine whether an auditor is
independent.
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Confusion between Auditing and Accounting
It is difficult to assess some of the extrinsic evidence relevant to
auditors' duties in 1933-4 because it simply refers to the rules and
standards of accounting. The distinction between accounting principles
and auditing standards appears to have been less clear then than it is
today. The frequent use of the term accounting at congressional hear
ings could indicate congressional indifference to specific auditor du
ties, conscious assignment of that topic to a lesser status, or confusion
between accounting and auditing. Staub, in a 1941 speech, described
the subtlety of the distinction at that time:
Auditing has been sometimes described as the analytical phase of the
accountant’s work and accounting per se as the synthetic phase. In prac
tice the line between the two often becomes very dim; in fact, that line is
frequently not apparent at all because of the overlapping of the two
phases.50
Commentators in the 1930s indicated that accounting principles
were of greater interest to the fledgling SEC than were matters con
cerning auditing. Werntz, speaking in 1939, stated: “ It is perhaps true
that the attention which events have directed toward standardizing
accounting principles has resulted in less attention to audit prob
lems.” 51 Staub indicated that, after the McKesson & Robbins case in
1940, the term “ audit” was at the center of conversations about ac
counting.52
Chatov claims that accountants helped Congress to confuse the
distinction between accounting and auditing in order to aid their goal
of keeping accounting and auditing rulemaking in the private sector.
He characterizes the following description of the problem by John L.
Carey as “ somewhat generous” : “The accountants may have taken
advantage of some of the confusion in . . . the distinction between
uniform accounting and standard audit requirements.” 53

The Absence of Specific Funding by Congress
It has been argued that Congress evinced an original, and continu
ing, policy against the SEC’s development of auditing standards by not
having provided, or at least earmarked, sufficient funds for that pur

50.
51.
52.
53.
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Staub, Auditing Developments, p. 4.
W. W. Werntz, "What is Expected of the Independent Auditor," p. 7.
Staub, Auditing Developments, p. 5.
See e.g., Chatov, Corporate Financial Standards Regulations, p. 53, citing J. L.
Carey, The Rise of the Accounting Profession, vol. 1 (New York: AICPA, 1969-70), p.
133.

pose.54 Also, prior to enactment of the securities acts, when Congress
was considering requiring federal audits, it expected to fund them
merely from registration fees, as is discussed in chapter 3.

Conclusion
Landis stated: "The experience of many years and of many nations
is epitomized in the provisions of the Securities Act. . . . The Securities
Act embodied little that was novel in conception, nor did it emanate
from a Congress that for the first time had been called upon to
consider the problem of security regulation.” 55 However, as other
draftsmen of the securities acts indicated, Congress did not consider
extensively specific auditor duties:
. . . Many uncertainties remain— some necessarily so. May an accountant
rely upon an appraiser’s certificate, where it does or where it does not
contain qualifications? May he rely upon an officer’s certificate of inven
tory? In a financial statement, what falls within the realm of fact, what within
the realm of opinion?56

54. Chatov, Corporate Financial Standards Regulations, pp. 418-419.
55. J. M. Landis, “ Liability Sections of Securities Act Authoritatively Discussed,” an
address before the Eleventh Annual Fall Conference of the NYS Society of CPAs
held in New York City, October 30, 1933, appearing in The American Accountant 18
(1933): 330.
56. Douglas and Bates, “The Federal Securities Act of 1933,” Yale Law Journal 43
(1933): 198.
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2
General Congressional
Expectations
High Expectations
Several of the specific congressional expectations discussed in
chapter 3 indicate that Congress may have had high expectations of
the services auditors would perform when it adopted the securities
acts. General support for a high level of congressional expectations of
auditors’ duties can be grouped into the categories that follow.

Reliance on Financial Statements
Section 11 of the 1933 act places greater responsibilities on ac
countants for the accuracy of the financial statements in registration
statements than it places on other “ participants” in registered se
curities offerings, other than the issuer.1 Accountants “ expertise” sec
tions of registration statements, unlike directors, underwriters, and
officers who sign the registration statement. Participants (except the
issuer) who are not “experts” do not need to "investigate” the “exper
tised” parts of the registration statement. For example, directors and
underwriters can rely on the auditors’ work to the extent that it leads to
certification of the financial statements, if the nonexpert “ has no rea
sonable ground to believe and did not believe” that the statements
were untrue.2
1.
2.

Section 11 refers to “accountants,” but the responsibilities generally pertain to
auditors.
Section 11(b)(3)(C). As to accountants, the expertised part of a registration state
ment is the certified financial statements. See Escott v. BarChris Construction Corp.,
283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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This duty of “ negative assurance” placed on the nonexpert for the
expertised parts of the registration statement was a result of congres
sional amendment of section 11 in 1934. This amendment changed the
provisions of the statute which had imposed a positive duty of “ belief”
in the truth of the statements. In 1934 Congress also changed the
standard for review by nonexperts of nonexpertised parts of the regis
tration statement from that of a “fiduciary” to that of a “ prudent man in
the management of his own property.” 3
Professor Folk’s analysis of the legislative history of these changes
was that “ neither amendment intended or effected a change of sub
stance.” Folk contended that the effect of the amendments on auditors’
responsibilities was clearly limited because a major reason for them
was that "section 11 in its original form terrified the investment commu
nity.” 4 Still, any reduction of responsibility of nonexperts under section
11, especially regarding the financial statements, can be viewed as an
increase in the responsibility of experts to some degree.
Auditors must make a "reasonable investigation” of their expertised
parts of 1933 act registration statements.5 This is formidable when
compared to the British Companies Act. “Section 11 broke new ground
by making experts liable for their misstatements; the English statutes
did not incorporate this development until the Companies Act of 1948,”
and “ section 11 goes beyond the 1948 Act in specifically mandating a
reasonable investigation by an expert and extending his liability to
misleading omissions.” 6
George O. May, senior partner of Price Waterhouse & Co. and a
leading accounting spokesman in his role as chairman of an important
AIA committee, characterized holding accountants liable for “ untrue
statements of a material fact” or omissions as an “unduly drastic
measure” :
The question that should really be put to the accountant is not whether the
balance sheet is true, but whether it is fair— fair in the accounting princi
ples on which it is based; fair in the way in which those principles are
applied to the facts; and fair in the way in which the results are presented.
These are matters of opinion. . . .
. .. Balance sheets, and profit and loss accounts are not, of course,
covered in the form of statements of fact; but a description with an amount
set opposite it is fairly capable of being judged as a statement of fact. The

3.
4.

5.
6.
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Section 11(c).
Folk, “ Civil Liabilities Under the Federal Securities Acts: The BarChris Case,” Virginia
Law Review 55 (1969): pp. 18-19. A second part of the article appears in the same
volume at pp. 199-271. Folk also states: “The present negative test of no reasonable
ground was substituted in 1934 for the original affirmative standard of reasonable
ground to believe, but this change was said to be only a concession to the terror
psychology of the investment community” (Ibid., p. 28).
Section 11(b).
Folk, "Civil Liabilities Under the Federal Securities Acts,” pp. 14-16.

comm on heading: “ Land, buildings, plant and machinery, at co st,” with a
figure set opposite, seems at first blush to be a simple statement of fact;
but in practice, what is fairly to be regarded as cost will often be a difficult
m atter of opinion, and always the question remains whether any, and if so,
what amplification of the heading is necessary to make the statement not
m isleading.7

May directly informed Congress that accounting, including the auditing
process, involved “ matters of opinion,” as discussed below. These
remarks somewhat tempered congressional expectations of auditors’
duties vis-à-vis other participants in the issuance of securities.

Expectations of Investors
Carter’s and May’s statements to Congress, that financial state
ments were matters of opinion, were factors that evidence low con
gressional expectations of auditors’ duties. However, Carter and May
also informed Congress that the public was not fully aware of this fact
about accounting and believed financial statements, especially when
accompanied by an auditor’s report, offered greater protection than
was possible.
Carter stated the following at the 1933 Senate hearings: “ I think the
impression generally prevails that one who reads a balance sheet and
an income statement regards the figures in such a statement as a
defensible definitely ascertainable fact. . . .” 8 Carter then reiterated the
point: “ Investors are too prone to regard balance sheets and income
accounts as positive and indisputable statements of fact. . . .”9 Also, as
discussed below, congressmen and others spoke with high esteem of
the work of the large accounting firms.
These assertions might seem unrealistic in light of the market crash
four years earlier. However, the public apparently realized that frenzied
speculation had been a major factor of inflated securities prices.10
Congress may have intended that required auditor performance be
set by the courts at the level of investor expectations in 1933-4, which
was high, or at a lower “floating” level if the profession was better able
to explain to investors the limitations of its work (which, apparently, it
still has not). The Conclusion of this study further explores the pos
sibility that Congress had a “flexible” intent regarding auditors’ duties
and discusses the permissibility of such unspecific legislative intent.

7. G. O. May, Twenty-five Years of Accounting Responsibility: 1911-36, vol. 2 (New
York: American Institute Publishing Co., 1936), pp. 81-83. The quote comes from an
address by May before the Illinois Society of Certified Public Accountants in Chi
cago, III. on December 6, 1933, and also appears in Journal of Accountancy 57
(1934): 9-23,
8. U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Banking and Currency, Hearings on S. 875,
73d Cong., 1st sess. (1933), p. 56 [hereinafter cited as 1933 Senate Hearings].
9. Ibid., p. 62.
10. G. Previts and B. Merino, Accounting in America, chap. 6 (publication forthcoming).
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Expectations Regarding the SEC and the Accounting Profession
The SEC’s statutory authority over auditing has been discussed in
chapter 1. Congress may have had high expectations of auditors’
duties by creating the SEC. Chatov quotes Frankfurter as stating that
“the evolution of model financial accounting methods, with which the
Commission is now charged, is well calculated to have far-reaching
beneficial effects on American corporate practices.” 11 Chatov asserts
that Frankfurter led Congress to believe that the SEC would develop
extensive accounting rules.12
Congress might have expected that even if the SEC did not pro
mulgate “ model financial accounting methods,” the private sector
would. As shown above, by 1933 the AIA had made some progress in
that direction in collaboration with the NYSE.
Furthermore, the SEC’s review of registration statements and other
filed documents (even for limited purposes), and the greater dis
semination of financial statements pursuant to the new acts, could
have been expected to provide the empirical data that were necessary
for the creation of auditing standards by the SEC or the private sector.
George Cochrane, a partner of Haskins & Sells, in a 1950 speech to
the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England, described this effect
of disclosures that resulted from the passage of the securities acts:
“ Consideration by the commission’s staff, of the accounting principles
used by companies filing reports and of the audit procedures under
taken by the independent accountant in such cases, has led to a much
wider knowledge of what is and is not being done by corporations and
accountants.” 13

Advancement in Auditing Techniques
The rapidly developing state of auditing in 1933-4 was described in
chapter 1. There does not appear to be any evidence that Congress
anticipated a significant increase in the complexity of business. There
fore, Congress could have deduced that greatly improved auditing
services were inevitable.
In the 1880s the first “ chartered” accountants from Great Britain
arrived in the United States.14 A Fortune article observed that the great
11. R. Chatov, “The Collapse of Corporate Financial Standards Regulations: A Study of
SEC-Accountant Interaction” (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley,
1973), p. 193. The dissertation in a slightly edited form has been published under
the title Corporate Financial Reporting: Public or Private Control (New York: Free
Press, 1975). Chatov relies on a September, 1934, Fortune article, which cannot be
located as cited.
12. Id.
13. G. Cochrane, “The Auditor’s Report: Its Evolution in the U.S.A.," The Accountant 123
(1950): 448-460.
14. Previts and Merino, Accounting in America, chap. 3. The authors note that there
were public accountants in the United States in the 18th century; but, not until the
British chartered accountants arrived was there a “ recognized” professional group.
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progress in public accounting by 1932 had occurred in those mere fifty
years.15 Staub, drawing from his professional experience, also de
scribed the significant development of auditing in that period.16 While
Congress was considering the securities act, the NYSE imposed a
requirement that the scope of audits be as extensive as those required
for loans by nonlisted companies in the 1929 version of the Federal
Reserve Board (FRB) Bulletin, Verification of Financial Statements, and
the new accountant’s report designed by the NYSE immediately filtered
down to other companies.17

Low Expectations
Business was less complex,
1933-4 than it is today. Therefore,
had low expectations of auditor
topics, presented to Congress in
proposition.

and auditing less sophisticated, in
it might be contended that Congress
duties. However, the following two
1933-4, lend greater support to that

Disparagement of Accounting and Auditing
When Congress was informed that accounting was a profession
concerned merely with “ opinions,” it may have expected that auditing
would develop little. May submitted the following memorandum to Con
gress in 1933:
In so far as accounting information is concerned, it seems to me funda
mentally im portant to recognize that the accounts of a modern business
are not entirely statements o f fact, but are, to a large extent, expressions of
opinion based partly on accounting conventions, partly on assumptions,
explicit or implicit, and partly on judgm ent (emphasis su p p lie d ).18

May indicated that one of the main draftsmen of the 1933 act under
stood this point. In a letter to Landis in 1933, May wrote:
I was particularly pleased to note your recognition of the undoubted fact
that accounts are expressions of opinions. This seems to me to be the only
sound starting point for any regulations relating to accounts or account
ants. I agree with you that, in the past, efforts have frequently been made
to represent accounts as being statements of fact to a greater extent than
they can possibly be, and no doubt accountants must assume a part of the
responsibility. However, some accountants, including myself, have for
years been very insistent on the opposite view, and I think that academ ic
authorities have had more influence than accountants.19
15. “Certified Public Accountants,” Fortune 5 (1932): 95.
16. W. A. Staub, Auditing Developments During the Present Century (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1942), particularly at pp. 9-15.
17. Cochrane, “The Auditor’s Report,” pp. 452-453.
18. “ Memorandum Regarding Securities Bill-H.R. 4314 (1933),” in May, Twenty-five
Years, vol. 2, p. 49.
19. Letter to the Hon. James M. Landis, November 2, 1933, in May, Twenty-five Years,
vol. 2, p. 64.
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Colonel Carter emphasized at the 1933 Senate hearings that the
auditor’s report accompanying financial statements only contained an
opinion: “ [An opinion] is all [independent accountants] can give; that is
all they can give. That is all anyone can give as to a balance sheet.”20
Carter objected to a provision in the proposed 1933 act that the
financial statements had to be sworn to as being correct: “ I do not see
that anyone can certify under oath that a balance sheet giving many
millions of dollars of assets is as a matter of fact correct. He can state
his opinion based upon a thorough investigation.” 21 Furthermore, one
of Carter’s principal arguments against audits by federal employees
was that government involvement with financial statements would in
crease the public’s reliance on the information.22
Carter’s warnings to Congress about financial statements were
aimed more directly at the limitations of auditing, while the criticisms of
financial statements by most other persons were directed toward the
shortcomings of accounting principles. Healy of the FTC, in congres
sional testimony, pointed out that financial statements failed to reflect
the effects of inflation.23 May, in a letter to Colonel M. C. Rorty in 1933,
also stated a concern about financial statements that is still with us—
their usefulness to investors:
The investor who actually relies on specific statements in a prospectus is a
com paratively rare bird. Subscriptions to new securities from such sources
would not supply a fraction of the needs of the country. The great bulk of
the subscriptions come from persons who rely on more general considera
tions, such as their belief in the issuer or in the underwriter.24

One of the reasons for these defensive statements by Carter and
May could have been to offset the view of those laypersons and
accounting spokesmen, such as Professor Ripley of Harvard, who
spoke of financial statements as a product of a precise science. Carter
and May seemed to have the floor regarding this issue at the hearings
on the securities acts because the other point of view appears not to
have been presented by the profession.
Congress may have disregarded the disparagement of auditors
because (a) many investors did rely on financial statements, and the
securities acts would encourage greater reliance; (b) accounting, more
than auditing, was being attacked; and (c) the critics of financial
statements, then as now, recognized their value for interperiod, and
intercompany, comparisons.
It is interesting to note that in 1931 the auditor’s report was revised
in an effort to reduce user reliance. As described by the AIA: “Ac
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
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216-219.
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countants therefore, by again changing the wording of their reports,
endeavored to make clear that the report was an opinion and not a
guarantee. The word ‘certify’ was eliminated and words indicating
agreement with the books were removed.”25 Notwithstanding, Con
gress still included the word “ certified” in the securities acts.26 It is
difficult to draw conclusions about congressional intent from these
facts because even Colonel Carter did not adopt the new terminology
at the 1933 Senate hearings: “ I do not see how the Federal Trade
Commission can properly discharge its duty by merely accepting a
statement that has not been independently examined and certified to
by an accountant.” 27

Rejection of Federal Auditors and the Federal Licensing of Public
Auditors
The federal government had some experience with “federal audits”
prior to 1933 through national bank examinations and uniform reports
required in the railroad industry. They were not very effective and
apparently were not examined at the 1933 hearings.
The rejection of audits by government employees of corporate
issuers leads at first to the conclusion that Congress lowered investors’
reliance on the auditing process. However, persons who knew that
Colonel Carter had a strong influence on the 1933 Senate hearings
typically reached the opposite conclusion, that Congress was prom
ised that public accountants would perform at a high level. For exam
ple, A. A. Sommer, when he was an SEC commissioner, stated:
It [C ongress] considered [in 1933] requiring that the accounts of publicly
held com panies be audited by a corps of federally employed accountants.
Only the earnest im portunings of the [accounting] profession and as
surances of its adequacy to do a satisfactory job im pelled Congress to
forego this proposal.28

However, a close examination of the 1933 Senate hearings indicates
that an assessment of Carter’s “ assurances” to Congress is a more
complex issue.
As discussed in chapter 1, Carter’s testimony did promise substan
tial auditor performance because he wanted Congress to rely on a
profession that it was not very familiar with and did not hold in very
high esteem. He began his testimony by implicitly complimenting the
work of independent accountants. Carter recommended that the pro
25. Letter from the AIA to the NYSE, December 21, 1933, in Audits of Corporate
Accounts (New York: AIA, 1934), p. 28.
26. Securities Act of 1933, sched. A, items (25)-(26), and Securities Exchange Act of
1934, secs. 12(b)(1)(J)-(K), 13(a)(2).
27. 1933 Senate Hearings, p. 56.
28. "The SEC and the FASB: Their Roles,” an address by then SEC Commissioner A. A.
Sommer, January 21, 1974, reprinted in Wiesen, Regulating Transactions in Se
curities (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1975), p. 273.

27

posed 1933 act “ be changed so as to afford even greater protection to
the investor than it now contemplates.” 29 In a preamble to his inde
pendent accountant proposal, Carter characterized FTC review of fi
nancial statements as placing “a burden of proof” on the FTC “ rather
than upon the issuer to develop full and reliable information.” 30 Carter
thereby suggested that Congress could have confidence in the re
sponse which issuers and public auditors would make to the require
ment of independent audits.
Then, and throughout much of his testimony, Carter denigrated the
quality of the work that Congress could expect of government auditors
on each occasion on which he complimented the work of his inde
pendent profession. He stated that auditing of issuers was “ an imprac
tical thing for the Government agency to do . . . effectively.”31 Carter
gave the following answers to the senators’ questions about whether
the agency supervising the act ought to perform an audit after the
independent accountant’s audit, if the proposed 1933 act were
changed to require independent audits:
S en ator Reynolds: All right. Then it goes to the Commission, does it

not?
Mr . Carter: Yes.
S en ator Reynolds: Have they got to check their accounts and your

accounts?
Mr. C a rte r: I do not think so. I do not think they would have to go to

that.
S ena tor Reynolds: Why should your members ask that they be permit
ted and empowered to check these accounts?
Mr. C a rte r: Because it is generally regarded that an independent audit
of any business is a good thing.
S e nator Reynolds: All right. Then, after it goes to the Commission they
have to check up to see who is right; they have to go through and audit
again. There has to be a Government audit, as suggested by Senator
Barkley. Would it not be creating more difficulty and more expense and
more time for the Government if auditing organizations interest themselves
in these various and sundry corporations?
Mr. C a rte r: I do not think so. I think if a corporation wished to issue
some securities and had been employing independent public accountants
for 20 years those accountants should be able to make this examination
more economically and quickly than the Government.
S e nator Reynolds: Could they do it more economically than the Gov
ernment?
M r . Carter: I think so.
S enator G ore : There would not be any doubt about that.
Senator Reynolds: Why?

29. 1933 Senate Hearings, p. 55. Carter seemed to apply that statement to all of his
proposals, including the abandonment of government audits, even though that
change was not the first one Carter discussed.
30. Id.
31. Ibid., p. 57.
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M r. C a rte r: We know the conditions of the accounts; we know the
ramifications of the business; we know the pitfalls of the accounting struc
ture that .the company maintains. You have got every kind of business to
deal with.32

Thus, Carter implied at the 1933 Senate hearings that federal auditors
would not be sufficiently experienced to audit an issuer within a rea
sonable time and cost limit and with a reasonable level of expertise.
The limited congressional preparation for federal auditing is another
reason that it is not possible to conclude that the rejection of federal
auditors displayed a high level of congressional expectations of public
auditors. This is evident in the following dialogue with Carter:
S ena tor Reynolds: Suppose that we decide in the final passage of this
bill here to employ five or six hundred auditors from your organization, that
would be all right, then, would it not?
M r . Carter: I do not think the Government could em ploy five or six
hundred independent accountants.
S enator Reynolds : Why could they not?
M r . Carter: I do not think the type of men that are in the public
practice of accountancy would leave their present practice to go in the
Government employ.
S ena tor Reynolds: Well, if it were sufficiently remunerative they would?
Mr. C a rte r: Yes; if the Government made their time worth while.
S e nator Reynolds: The bill here provides for taking care of the ex

penses incident thereto by way of registration.
Mr. C a rte r: Well, you will have to build some more buildings in Wash
ington to house them if you are going to do that.
S e nator Reynolds: Then we had better not pass this bill at all.33

It cannot be determined whether Senator Reynolds was being face
tious in his reference to new government buildings for auditors in
Washington because of the limited thought that had been given to the
establishment of a corps of government auditors.
In sum, Carter argued that independent, public auditors would be
preferable to government auditors, but his conclusion was based on a
low appraisal of what government auditors could accomplish.
The fact that Congress planned to pay the government auditors
through registration fees also supports low congressional expectations
of the work of federal auditors. Even comparing these funds to the
small independent auditing fees for small issuers, as described by
Carter in chapter 3 (“ Cost Constraints” section), would have revealed
that only very limited audits could have been performed. This was
especially the case if the other costs of supervising the 1933 act would
have had to have been paid by the registration fees.
Congress may not have realized this problem of funding federal
audits because it did not consider the scope of the FTC’s initial
32. Ibid., pp. 58-59.
33. Ibid., p. 59.
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examination of an issuer’s financial statements, nor the circumstances
which would have required a more intensive examination. In an ex
change between Carter and Ferdinand Pecora, counsel at the 1933
Senate hearings, it appears that Pecora contemplated a higher stand
ard for FTC “ re-examination” of a registration statement prior to regis
tration cancellation than did Carter.34 The absence of substantial
congressional consideration of this subject is further evidence that
Congress did not have high expectations of auditors’ duties.
Although Carter began his testimony at the 1933 Senate hearings
by complimenting the work of independent auditors, he was more
restrained in the balance of his testimony. As described above, Carter
warned that financial statements and the accompanying auditor’s re
port were statements of opinion. He did not shirk the accounting
profession’s responsibility for some of the “debacle” in the securities
markets, giving the following bland response to a question on that
subject: “You still have some very sound companies and industries in
this country.” 35 Carter did not assert that accountants had a great
interest in auditing— “the detail work of auditing is usually done by a
subordinate”— nor did he promise fixed guidelines on auditing.36 Once
congressmen realized how little they knew about auditing, independent
auditors, and government auditors, Carter did not have to pressure
them to abandon proposed federal audits.
In contrast to the issue of competence, the independence of audi
tors was not focused upon at the 1933 Senate hearings, even though a
corps of federal auditors would have avoided issuers’ directly paying
auditors.
The failure of Congress to adopt federal licensing of auditors sug
gests, on balance, low congressional expectations of auditor perform
ance, since, as seen in chapter 3 (“ Auditor Competence” section), the
states were not uniformly effective in regulating the profession through
licensing. Furthermore, proposals for the federal licensing of auditors
were not new in 1933. As early as 1899, John A. Cooper, a prominent
CPA, proposed a national system of registering accountants.37 A dec
ade later, Edward N. Hurley, chairman of the FTC, made similar pro
posals, which were opposed by the AIA.38
The licensing issue is discussed in chapter 3 as it relates to the
competence of auditors. Other specific congressional expectations dis
cussed in that chapter evidence limited expectations of auditors’ du
ties, particularly cost constraints on audits.

34.
35.
36.
37.

Ibid., p. 63.
Ibid., p. 60.
Ibid., p. 61.
Speech before Illinois Association of Public Accountants, Chicago, Dec. 12, 1899, in
The Accountant 29 (1903): 1251-53 and 1508.
38. “ Registration of Accountants,” Journal of Accountancy 23 (1917): 185-89.
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3
Specific Congressional
Expectations
Responsibility for Accurate Financial Statements
Auditors vis-à-vis Management
The chairman of the 1933 Senate hearings made the following
analysis of management’s duty to provide accurate financial state
ments under the 1933 act:
I do not see why the com pany should not be responsible, because the
people it em ploys to check up inventories, and all that sort of thing . . .
must know about [these things], and they must not be m isleading so as to
cause loss.1

This statement seems to indicate that Congress was relying more on
management than auditors to discover errors in the reporting of inven
tories and “ that sort of thing.” However, that observation must be
tempered by the fact that the chairman’s statement was made in the
context of defending the shared responsibility for false statements
between the company and others in sections 11 and 12 of the 1933
act.2 A discussion of liability under the 1933 act was presented in
chapter 2.
Similarly, it would be incorrect to base speculation about congres
sional expectations of auditors vis-à-vis management on Carter’s dis
1.
2.

U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Banking and Currency, Hearings on S. 875,
73d Cong., 1st sess. (1933), p. 210 [hereinafter cited as 1933 Senate Hearings].
Ibid., pp. 208-211.
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suading Congress from requiring an officer of an issuer to “verify under
oath . . . that the statements, exhibits, and documents are correct.” 3
Carter attacked this provision on the basis that neither management
nor auditors could make this promise about financial information, nor
would investors benefit from it.4 On balance, Carter’s testimony at the
1933 Senate hearings emphasized the responsibility of management as
compared to that of auditors:
[The auditor's opinion] can only be an opinion based upon certain ac
counting assumptions which must be applied to the opinion of some
individual as to values.5

A self-serving statement from the accounting profession about the
primary role of management in financial reporting may have come to
the attention of Congress. In the letter by nine leading accounting firms
to the president of the NYSE on February 24, 1933, the accounting
firms stated:
We think it well to . . . emphasize the fact that accounts must necessarily
be largely expressions of judgment, and that the primary responsibility for
forming these judgments must rest on the management of the corporation.
And though the auditor must assume the duty of expressing his dissent
through a qualification in his report, or otherwise, if the conclusions
reached by the management are in his opinion manifestly unsound, he
does not undertake in practice, and should not, we think, be expected to
substitute his judgment for that of the management when the difference is
not of major importance, when the management’s judgment is not unrea
sonable and when he has no reason to question its good faith.6

The search for specific congressional intent on the relative roles of
management and auditor prior to, or at the time of, enactment of the
securities acts is shown to be difficult when one reconsiders the
following statement by one of the principal draftsmen of the 1933 act:
Many uncertainties remain— some necessarily so. May an accountant rely
upon an appraiser’s certificate, where it does or where it does not contain
qualifications? May he rely upon an officer’s certificate of inventory? In a
financial statement, what falls within the realm of fact, what within the realm
of opinion?7

However, the post-enactment history of the securities acts may be
instructive about congressional intent. Staub, in a 1941 speech, de
scribed the SEC’s lack of involvement with auditing matters:
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
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Ibid., pp. 57 and 62.
Ibid., p. 62. In this testimony, Carter stated that the oath could be given by issuers if
it was in terms of “the best of his knowledge and belief.”
Ibid., p. 56.
American Institute of Accountants, Audits of Corporate Accounts (New York: AIA,
1934), p. 25.
Douglas and Bates, ‘‘The Federal Securities Act of 1933,” Yale Law Journal 43
(1933): 198.

It is significant that in the course of the seven years during which the
Securities and Exchange Commission has been reviewing the registration
statements filed with it under the Securities Act (security issues) and the
Securities Exchange Act (security listings and corporate annual reports)
the questions which the Commission has raised regarding financial state
ments have in only a few instances been the result of financial irregularities
as such but have dealt largely with the propriety or otherwise of the
application of accounting principles to various circumstances and trans
actions of the registrants.8

The SEC initially emphasized that the accuracy of financial state
ments was the primary responsibility of management. Barr and Koch
suggested that as a reason why the SEC in its early years failed to
bring many cases against auditors or to establish extensive auditing
requirements:
Of special significance was the Interstate Hosiery Mills case in which the
Commission set forth its views as to the relative responsibility of a regis
trant and its management and a certifying accountant in assuring the
accuracy of financial statements. The Commission stated in its decision
that the fundamental and primary responsibility for the accuracy of informa
tion filed with the Commission rests upon management, and the employ
ment of independent public accountants, however reputable, is not a
substitution for management’s accounting of its stewardship but instead,
serves as a check on that accounting.9

Many years later the SEC expressed the same position in addressing
the independence of accountants: ‘‘The financial statements are the
responsibility of the client and all decisions with respect to them must
ultimately be assumed by the client.” 10
The SEC’s first involvement with financial statement problems not
only emphasized management’s responsibility, but also, according to a
commentator, required only auditor disclosure of financial statement
deficiencies:
From these and other cases it is apparent that the Commission is willing to
pass financial statements which may be deficient in setting forth accepted
accounting practice provided the certifying accountant clearly points out
the deficiency and states what the effect would be had more acceptable
practice been followed. Its reasoning for this treatment results from the fact
that it is administering a disclosure rather than a regulatory act and that a
statement from the accountants concerning the accounting practice of the
registrant gives a better picture of the managerial policy of the company
than if the independent accountant were to revise the registrant’s balance

8. W. A. Staub, Auditing Developments During the Present Century (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1942), p. 91.
9. Barr and Koch, “Accounting and the S.E.C.," George Washington Law Review 28
(1959): 187.
10. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Independence of Accountants, ASR no.
126 (July 5, 1972), p. 3.
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sheet and income statement to reflect more generally accepted principles
and practices.11

This statement appears to apply to auditing problems, as well as to
the choice of accounting principles. As stated above, a fine line sepa
rates the two aspects of accounting, and this was more so in the 1930s
than it is today.

Auditors vis-à-vis Directors
Arthur Andersen, writing in 1935, described a limited role for audi
tors vis-à-vis directors:
The [lay person] must realize that the determination of the value at which
assets of a corporation are stated in its accounts is a function of the board
of directors. It is the function of the accountant to describe the basis of
stating such values.12

This statement is also relevant to the previous discussion of the com
parative duties of management vis- à-vis auditors. In this subsection,
the principal issue is the role of nonmanagement (outside) directors in
reviewing financial statements.
The provisions of section 11 of the 1933 act have been discussed
above, along with the significant and relevant changes adopted in
1934. The emphasis there was on the high congressional expectations
of auditor duties that may have resulted from the possibly limited
“ review” role planned for directors.
The case for imposing significant responsibilities on directors was
made at committee hearings in 1933. A House committee was informed
that the British law allowed directors to rely upon, among other things,
“the statements of certified public accountants with respect to the
financial affairs of the company, of experts with respect to certain
values of property carried in the balance sheet, of the public account
ants and the president and officers with respect to accounts and bills
receivable and their estimate of whether they are good.” 13 The same
point was made at the 1933 Senate hearings by Ollie M. Butler, an
attorney for the Department of Commerce and one of the draftsmen of
the 1933 act, who testified: “ [Director reliance] is possible under the

11. A. Smith, “Accounting Practice Under the Securities and Exchange Commission,”
The Accounting Review 10 (1935): 331. In 1938, the SEC made it clear that the use
of accounting principles “for which there is no substantial authoritative support,” will
be presumed to be misleading despite disclosure (U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission, Administrative Policy on Financial Statements, ASR no. 4, [April 25,
1938]).
12. Andersen, “Present-day Problems Affecting the Presentation and Interpretation of
Financial Statements,” Journal of Accountancy 60 (1935): 334.
13. U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Hearings
on H.R. 4314, 73d Cong., 1st sess. (1933), p. 169 [hereinafter cited as 1933 House
Hearings].
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British system of government, where the central government has abso
lute control over [auditors and other] experts, and can demand certain
requirements of them.” 14 He described as “ not so adequate” the “ qual
ification” legislation regarding accountants in some states, and con
cluded that “to excuse the directors for a misstatement based on the
report of some auditors or certified accountants Would practically nullify
the strength of the responsibility [of directors] provision [of section 11
of the 1933 act].” 15 Similarly, a Senate Banking and Currency Commit
tee report accompanying the proposed 1933 act stated: “ If a director
can excuse himself by saying that he has in good faith relied upon an
accountant’s statement . . . . then the investor will continue in the same
position from which the nation is struggling to extricate him.” 16
Further evidence that Congress set high expectations for directors
vis-à-vis auditors was the fact that, as Butler reported to Congress, the
attack on the proposed 1933 act was “ being made chiefly against the
responsibility of directors and the revocation [of registration] clauses of
the bill.” 17 As described in chapter 2 in the section on “ Reliance on
Financial Statements,” Congress assisted directors in 1934 by enacting
two amendments to the 1933 act. However, Folk observed that “ neither
amendment intended or effected a change of substance.” 18
There are factors, however, which indicate lower expectations of
directors. As observed in chapter 2, in 1933 Congress set greater
responsibilities for U.S. auditors than were required of their British
counterparts. Furthermore, at the 1933 Senate hearings the time limita
tions of outside directors were discussed. One senator observed that
directors lacked the ability to “ verify every figure which was in their
annual statement or prospectus.” 19 Another senator suggested, as a
solution to this problem, that an auditor ought to be criminally liable for
any false statement in his report, even if it arose from only gross
negligence. He stated: “You would be reaching the source in that
case.” 20 Mr. Breed, counsel to a tristate investment bankers associa
tion, posed the following rhetorical question to the senators discussing
this topic:
Which of you gentlemen who sits on a corporation’s board of directors,
which has a list of accounts receivable, can physically possibly go over
every one of a thousand and in some cases it may be tens of thousands of

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
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items of accounts due from all over the United States and the world, and
guarantee that every one of those are worth 100 percent on the dollar?21

Additional evidence of both high and low congressional expecta
tions of director responsibilities is presented below in the sections on
auditor and auditing firm competence. The most conclusive and proba
bly most important point to note from the allocation of responsibilities
between directors and auditors is that Congress was concerned about
the balance between the two. The importance of this observation is
discussed in this study’s Conclusion.

Employee Defalcations
As stated in chapter 2, the NYSE’s 1933 announcement requiring
independent audits stipulated that the scope of the audit be no less
than that indicated in the 1929 FRB Bulletin titled “Verification of Finan
cial Statements.” The bulletin stated: ‘‘The scope of the work indicated
in these instructions includes . . . an examination of the accounting
system for the purpose of ascertaining the effectiveness of the internal
check.” 22 It was the NYSE’s understanding that the bulletin “ clearly
indicated that the scope of the examination therein provided for was
not such as would lead naturally to detection of . . . defalcations on the
part of employees. . . .” 23 Similarly, the 1933 reply of the nine leading
public accounting firms to a request for information by the NYSE
confirmed that audits, especially of large companies such as those on
the NYSE, would not "naturally” detect employee defalcations. The
letter stated: “ Such companies rely on an adequate system of internal
check to prevent or disclose defalcations, and independent account
ants making a financial examination do not attempt to duplicate the
work of the internal auditors.” 24 The following statement in the report of
the NYSE’s Committee on Stock List to the exchange’s governing
committee agreed with this assessment of audit scope, but then stated
a higher expectation:
Your comm ittee is satisfied that the detailed scrutiny and verification of the
cash transactions of large com panies can most efficiently and econom 
ically be perform ed by perm anent employees of the corporation, par
ticularly today, when bookkeeping is to so large an extent done by
m echanical means, and that it would involve unwarranted expense to
transfer such work to independent auditors or to require them to duplicate
the work of the internal organization. Your committee, however, feels that

21. Ibid., p. 169 (Mr. William C. Breed was considered a lobbyist for persons who were
directors of corporations).
22. U.S. Federal Reserve Board, Verification of Financial Statements, FRB bulletin
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1929), p. 1.
23. AIA, Audits of Corporate Accounts, p. 19.
24. Ibid., p. 23.
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the auditors should assume a definite responsibility for satisfying them 
selves that the system of the internal check provides adequate safeguards
and should protect the com pany against any defalcation of major im por
tance.25

For the purpose of assessing congressional expectations, it is more
important to analyze the auditors’ view of the extent of their duties than
the NYSE’s expectations of auditors. Although May, in his role as
chairman of the AlA’s Special Committee on Cooperation with Stock
Exchanges, wrote to the Committee on Stock List in December 1933
that the need for detailed audits existed “ where the internal check and
control are necessarily limited or severely restricted . . . ,” he qualified
the auditor’s responsibility: “ We would, however, point out that it is
always a matter of judgment on the part of corporate management to
weigh the risks against which safeguards are desirable in comparison
with the cost of providing safeguards.” 26 May concluded his letter with
the following statement:
The whole matter lies in the field of discretion, and if in any case a
defalcation should occur and escape detection, the accountants cannot be
expected to accept any financial responsibility, but only to accept such
blame as may attach to a possible error of judgm ent on their part with
respect to their review of the m ethods and extent of the internal check and
control.27

Management’s ability to place cost constraints on the detection of
employee defalcations is part of the broader subject of cost constraints
on audits discussed below.

Testing and Staff Supervision
A new auditor’s report developed in 1933 included the concept of
sample testing for the first time: “ . . . we examined or tested account
ing records of the company and other supporting evidence. . . .” 28 May
described the importance of testing in 1933:
While the work of accountants today involves the use of a large staff, it is
obviously im practicable for the accountant even with a large staff to exam
ine all the transactions of even a m oderate-sized corporation. His pro
cedure is, therefore, a varied one— in some cases, he will make a fairly
com plete independent check; in other cases, he will make tests; in still
other cases, he must rely on the records of the corporation, satisfying
himself that they are so kept and checked as to justify such reliance as a
reasonable business procedure.

25.
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In considering, therefore, what degree of responsibility may wisely and
rightfully be imposed on the accountant, one must start from the premise
that: (a) his work is in part in the nature of confirmation of facts, and in part
an expression of judgment; (b) his procedure is necessarily to a large
extent one of testing— he cannot scrutinize every transaction; (c) his work
is necessarily carried on largely through subordinates.29

It is important to note May’s last point, that at the time the securities
acts were adopted an audit required the extensive use of subordi
nates. The statement was made in a speech that was published in the
Journal of Accountancy and was, therefore, available to Congress
when it enacted the 1934 act.30
As discussed in chapter 2, Carter stated at the 1933 Senate hear
ings that “the detail work of auditing is usually done by a subordi
nate.”31 Congress may have realized that the auditing process was
subject to ordinary failures in communication and training.

Auditor Competence
Congressmen and others suggested in 1933-4 that there was a
wide variation in the competence of auditors. In the course of consider
ing the federal licensing of auditors,32 Butler testified that in some
states the statutes licensing accountants were “ adequate,” while in
other states they were “ not so adequate.” 33 As described above, this
was the reason that Butler advocated that section 11 of the 1933 act
require that directors have some responsibility for the accuracy of the
financial statements.
Senator Couzens stated that the federal licensing of auditors was
feasible since the Bureau of Internal Revenue had been able to certify
persons who practiced before it.34 Butler claimed that licensing would
provoke criticism from those who were not allowed to practice their
profession, but Couzens dismissed this as unimportant. Butler sug
gested that the Senate committee might want to consider the licensing
question in executive session, to determine whether auditors should be
“ controlled” through licensing “to an extent that their statements might

29. G. O. May, Twenty-five Years of Accounting Responsibility: 1911-36, vol. 2 (New
York: American Institute Publishing Co., 1936), p. 72.
30. The speech was delivered to the Illinois Society of Certified Public Accountants in
Chicago, Ill., on December 6, 1933, and published in Journal of Accountancy 57
(1934): 9-23.
31. 1933 Senate Hearings, p. 61.
32. 1933 Senate Hearings, pp. 208-210, 247, and U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee
on Banking and Currency, Hearings on S. Res. 84 and S. Res. 56 and S. Res. 97,
73d Cong., 2d sess. (1934), p. 7616 [hereinafter cited as 1934 Senate Hearings],
33. 1933 Senate Hearings, p. 247.
34. Ibid., pp. 247-248.
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be taken as a safeguard to the investing public.” 35 Butler and Couzens
agreed that their main concern was that the majority of directors
should not merely be “ advertising matter,” but they concluded their
exchange by apparently accepting the existing variation in the per
formance of auditors, Butler stating that “the serious director would
experience very little difficulty with this law, because he would be
careful in the selection of his auditors. . . .” 36
The issue of licensing of auditors was also discussed at the 1934
Senate hearings when Healy testified:
S ena tor Kean: . . . What I thought was that you ought to have authority
in this bill to license accountants and engineers. What do you think of that?
I have just put it to the witness, Mr. Chairman, as to whether the Commis
sion ought to have authority to license accountants and engineers.
Mr. Healy: My first reply was— some of the committee were busy with
something else— that I would be very pleased, as far as I am concerned, if
the day would come when public accountants would be licensed and
would have to report to stockholders instead of to directors and would
have a dignified position of responsibility under Federal laws. Whether or
not public sentiment and the sentiment of Congress is at the point where
they are willing that engineers and accountants should be licensed by the
Federal Trade Commission I do not know. I have some doubt about it.
The Chairman: We have enough to deal with now without going into
outside questions. The complaint about this bill is that it goes too far.
S ena tor Kean: Yes; it does in some respects; I agree to that. I am
opposed to the bill in some respects, but I am in favor of having account
ants that are responsible and engineers that are responsible. For instance,
if I make an issue of securities I hire the highest class and the best people
that I can get, and I do not restrain them in any way. They are to make a
report of the situation. I take their report and publish it, and I am bound
more or less by that report. I issue securities by it, and I pick the very best
I can get. If they make mistakes, I suffer.
The Chairman: Would it be any better if they were licensed? Licensed
men make mistakes.
M r. Pecora: It would not add to their knowledge or efficiency. The fact
that a lawyer has a certificate of admission to the bar does not improve his
knowledge of the law.
M r. Healy : I should like to interject an observation, if the comm ittee will
permit, which is not particularly apropos of anything, that eventually the
solution for m any of these problems is going to come from a com pulsory
incorporating or licensing of all corporations engaged in interstate com 
merce.
The Chairman: You mean, to give them Federal charters?37

This testimony from the 1934 Senate hearings leads to the same
conclusions about congressional consideration of auditors’ compe
tence as the 1933 Senate hearings.
35. Ibid., p. 248.
36. Id.
37. 1934 Senate Hearings, p. 7616. Part of this testimony is referenced in chap. 1, n. 21,
in the discussion of “Congressional Consideration of the Role of Auditors Under the
Securities Acts.”
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In the first place, auditors’ competence and federal licensing of
auditors were not given profound consideration. At the 1934 Senate
hearings quoted directly above, Healy found that “ some of the commit
tee were busy with something else” when he discussed the licensing
of auditors the first time. He was not being rhetorical when answering,
“ I do not know,” to the question whether auditors ought to be licensed,
but the chairman ended the discussion.
At the 1933 Senate hearings Butler suggested that directors in
Britain could rely on financial statements because in Britain “the central
Government has absolute control over such experts [e.g., auditors],
and can demand certain requirements of them.” 38 This was an over
statement of British regulation of auditing. Accountants were not li
censed in Britain, only their professional institutes were. In fact, it has
been said that British auditing has always been more “free enterprise”
than U.S. auditing because of the absence of government involvement
with licensing.39 Butler’s misconception was not repeated at the 1934
Senate hearings when the subject of federal licensing of auditors was
discussed.40 The misinformation at the prior year’s hearings can only
support the thesis in chapter 1, that Congress lacked a vigorous
interest in auditing matters.
Secondly, the testimony indicated that there was great variation in
the competence of auditors. It was stated that the quality of state
licensing of accountants varied. Directors were advised to “ be careful
in the selection of . . . auditors.” 41
Thirdly, there was significant disparagement of auditing, as seen in
chapter 2. Butler testified that licensing would be required to make the
auditor’s statement a “ safeguard,” and Healy hoped that "the day
would come” when public accountants “would have a dignified posi
tion of responsibility under Federal laws.”42
For these reasons, and by rejecting the federal licensing of auditors
after some evidence that it was feasible, Congress appeared to lack
interest in affirmatively raising the performance level of auditors.

Auditing Firm Competence
The congressional hearings produced testimony implying that the
small accounting firms were less competent than the larger ones.
Congress could have anticipated that the financial statements of

38.
39.
40.
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1933 Senate Hearings, p. 247.
Professor Brief made this statement in an interview described in chap. 1, n. 33.
1934 Senate Hearings, p. 7616.
1933 Senate Hearings, p. 248.
Id. and 1934 Senate Hearings, p. 7616, respectively. However, as discussed above,
this testimony must be tempered by its context— an attempt to have Congress place
greater responsibilities on directors.

smaller companies would be reviewed by smaller accounting firms.
The large accounting firms would avoid audits of companies which
were not well established because such companies had a greater
likelihood of producing 1933 act liability. Douglas and Bates, writing
shortly after the 1933 act was adopted, stated: “ It may be expected
that the reputable [accounting] firms may be more chary than ever of
becoming experts for any but the more substantial issuers."43 If Con
gress did not expect that the 1933 act would prevent small companies
from raising capital,44 then Congress could have anticipated that small
accounting firms would be reviewing the financials for 1933 act regis
tration statements.
When members of the Senate Banking and Currency Committee
questioned Carter about the cost of audits, they inquired about the
cost for the “thousands of small companies putting out an issue for
their original financing.”45 However, Congress might have anticipated
that only large companies would be entering the equity markets, since
Congress was told that underwriters would only participate in issues by
such companies because of their own exposure to 1933 act liability.46
Furthermore, size of the issuer was then, as now, a requirement for
listing on an exchange, and the “ OTC” market was not effective to
handle the trading of small issues. Therefore, the small accounting
firms would not be frequently involved with 1933 act registration state
ments.
In any event, testimony on the tiered structure of the accounting
profession must have lowered congressional expectations of auditors’
duties to some extent. Healy told the 1933 House hearings that there
are “ many fine accounting firms,” and “ many accounting firms that are
not so fine.” 47 At the 1933 Senate hearings Huston Thompson engaged
in the following dialogue:
M r . Thompson : . . . Senator Couzens, I think if I were in that position
[dire cto r of a large corporation] I would see to it that I got the very best
accountants possible, persons I could depend on.
Senator C ouzens : That is true.
Mr. Thompson: Ernst & Ernst, or somebody like them.48

As cited above, Butler, testifying at the same hearings, stated that
“the serious director would experience very little difficulty with this law,
because he would be careful in the selection of his auditors. . . .”49 It is
unclear whether Butler was referring to individual auditors or to audit
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46.
47.
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49.

Douglas and Bates, “The Federal Securities Act of 1933,” p. 198.
1933 House Hearings, p. 243.
1933 Senate Hearings, pp. 60-61.
1933 House Hearings, p. 243.
Ibid., p. 244.
1933 Senate Hearings, p. 210.
Ibid., p. 248.

41

ing firms. Large accounting firms tend to have more experience with
corporate and securities matters and to have certain structural advan
tages over smaller firms, of which Congress, in 1933-4, may have been
aware.
Price Waterhouse & Co. stated the following in a 1933 letter to its
branch offices regarding notification to the national office of objections
to a client’s “form or substance of accounts” : “ Obviously, unless the
leading firms take a stand for proper principles when the necessity
arises, it is not fairly to be expected that the smaller firms, which
occupy a much less favorable position, will do so.” 50 The “ less favor
able position” of smaller firms results from the greater likelihood that
they will be dependent on one or a few clients for economic survival,
which is also the case for small local offices of large firms.
National office review provides another structural advantage for
larger firms, since the audit staff can contact in-house specialists on
various matters. The auditor’s increased competence is also useful in
resisting client demands. Although there does not appear to be spe
cific evidence of congressional awareness of national office review,
testimony quoted in this study has shown that congressmen seemed to
have general familiarity with the large accounting firms.
In sum, committee members who considered the 1933 act seemed
to believe that large accounting firms were more prepared to handle
new responsibilities under that act, but they did not take particular
action based on that belief.

Independence Under Client “Pressure”
The greater ability of large firms to withstand client “ pressure” has
been discussed in the previous subsection. Congress may have ex
pected that auditors generally would be able to resist client pressure
because of the trend in that direction in 1933 and the effect of enacting
laws that placed heavy responsibilities on auditors.

The Trend in 1933
Cochrane reports that auditors had little authority vis-^-vis their
clients in the early 1920s:
Efforts were continually made by outstanding accountants to discourage
. . . misleading accounting and reporting m ethods but, unfortunately, the
professional accountant was not then clothed with authority either by stat

50. A letter to all United States and Canadian Offices of Price Waterhouse & Co.,
January 16, 1933, in May, Twenty-five Years, vol. 1, pp. 145-146.
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ute or by public acceptance. Corporate management frequently depended
on its legal advisers for accounting advice and the efforts of accountants
to obtain acceptance of the accounting principles involved were nullified
by advice that the presentation desired by the company was legal.51

According to Cochrane, by the late 1920s “ accountants more and
more frequently objected to the practices used and many insisted
upon qualifications in their reports,” 52 although there is no specific
evidence that this trend was brought to the attention of Congress.

Liability Under the Securities Acts
Congress could have expected that enactment of the securities
acts, especially the 1933 act, would strengthen the auditor’s ability to
influence the preparation and presentation of financial statements. The
auditor’s report was widely required by a federal statute and an admin
istrative agency, and it could create civil and criminal liability for the
auditor. Cochrane stated: “The [1933] Act, of course, placed a new
and heavy responsibility on the professional accountant and, of neces
sity, increased his authority.” 53 Staub, speaking in 1941, expressed this
point in the following way:
Accountants have taken seriously the provisions of the two securities acts
and have sought to impress the importance thereof on their clients as well,
particularly in respect of those accounting matters which are particularly
within the scope of the auditor’s duties. The requirements of the acts and
the activities of the Securities and Exchange Commission have given
valuable support to accountants in their continuous efforts for improve
ments in accounting practice and for the adequacy of disclosures essential
to presenting a complete picture of financial position and results of opera
tions.54

A new law can be welcome because it provides a reason for not
participating in questionable conduct. For example, financial vice-pres
idents of corporations have been better able to resist the pressure from
security analysts and others to disclose “ inside information” since the
SEC began its pursuit of insider “tipping” in the mid-1960s.55 Auditors
have probably welcomed the recent enactment of a law against most
kinds of foreign bribes.56 Auditors had a similar reaction to their in
creased responsibilities in 1933-4.
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Time and Cost Constraints
Congress considered the time and cost of audits for 1933 act
registration statements and for the annual reporting requirement under
the 1934 act. Some congressmen were concerned that there would be
insufficient time and money for a yearly audit.

Time Constraints
When Congress considered the proposal for federal auditors under
the 1933 act it did not contemplate that there would be time constraints
on such audits. Registration statements under the act would be filed
throughout the year, and therefore, the auditor’s work would be likely to
be distributed over the year.
At the 1934 Senate hearings, May implied that if the proposed 1934
act did not require that the fiscal years of regulated companies be
staggered, Congress should expect some deficiencies in auditor serv
ices:
If the amount of auditing required were expanded as this bill would neces
sitate, it would tax the resources of the accounting profession. The great
difficulty of the present position is that nearly all com panies end their year
at D ecem ber 31, and if the amount of work to be done at D ecem ber 31
were so enormously increased as this bill would increase it, then I do not
think it would be within the capacity of the accounting profession, by any
reasonable expansion, to take care of that work within a reasonable period
after the end of the year.
I would like to see introduced into the bill a provision which would help to
distribute the work of auditing over the year. I think it would enormously
increase the value of the audit to the investor.57

The SEC perceived the same problem six years later in the McKes
son & Robbins case:
We deplore, as do accounting firms, the necessity for recruiting large
numbers of tem porary employees during a very short busy season. This
condition and the lack of training in the firm ’s methods which it ordinarily
entails are inimical to attaining the best results from the auditors’ services.
A major im provem ent in this condition could be m ade by the general
adoption by corporations of the natural business year for accounting pur
poses.58

Since Congress was informed in 1934 of the difficulty accounting
firms would have in sending highly trained staff on audits in the first
three months of each year, Congress appears to have been conscious
of the time parameters which the 1934 act would create.

57. 1934 Senate Hearings, pp. 7177-78.
58. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, In the Matter of McKesson & Robbins,
ASR no. 19 (December 5, 1940), p. 4.
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Cost Constraints
As discussed in chapter 2, Congress did not give great thought to
the proposal for federal audits, partly because such audits would not
be a very extensive undertaking. Congress expected that federal au
dits would be (1) performed by persons who might have limited audit
ing experience and would certainly have limited experience with the
audited company, (2) performed by a small number of auditors, (3)
funded solely from registration fees, and (4) conducted without exten
sive guidelines. Therefore, the congressmen at the 1933 Senate hear
ings were inclined toward low audit costs when they dropped the
federal audit proposal and considered independent audits.
Carter provided a sanguine description of the ability of companies
to pay for an audit by an independent accountant in the following two
dialogues at the 1933 Senate hearings:
M r. C a rte r: Eighty-five percent of all the companies listed on the New
York Stock Exchange have independent audits.
S enator Gore: So it would not be any added expense?
M r . C arter: Not to them.
The Chairman: This bill covers all of them, those listed and those not

listed.
Mr. C a rte r: Those are the ones that should be independently audited.
S en ator Reynolds: Which ones?
Mr. C a rte r: Those that are not listed.
S e nator Reynolds: All right; the ones that are not listed are the little

fellows, are they not?
M r. C a rte r: Yes, sir.
S en ator Reynolds: Could they pay you $75 a day to go into their

books?
Mr. C a rte r: They do not have to.
S enator Reynolds : Who pays you?
M r . Carter: It does not cost them $75 a day.
S enator Reynolds: H ow much do you charge a day, then?
Mr. C a rte r: It would cost them an average of, I should say, $25 a day.
S en ator Kean: What big companies charge $25?
M r. Carter: That is about an average.
S enator Kean: Marwick, Mitchell & Co. cost more than that.
M r . Carter: i am giving you an average.
S enator Kean: Waterhouse & Co. cost more than that. What companies

do you know of that charge only $25 a day?
M r. C a rte r: I said that was an average for all. The rates range from
$100 a day for a partner down to $15 and $20 a day for a junior. The
average scale of rates that are charged are $35, $30, $25, $20 and $15,
depending upon the class of men.
S enator K ean : H ow many men would it take?
Mr. C a rte r: Put one partner in.
S enator K ean : Only put one partner in?
Mr. C a rte r: Yes, sir.
S enator K ean : That is $100 a day.
M r. Carter: That is right, at that rate for the proportion of his time
devoted, and he is usually worth it.
S enator Reynolds : H ow many days does it take on the average to
audit a small com pany?
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M r . Carter : It would depend upon the business.
Senator Reynolds : Of course, I understand, but generally, Colonel, just
give me some idea.
M r . Carter : Well, take a com pany selling automobiles doing a rela
tively small business, you could probably audit it in two days and a half.
S enator Reynolds : That would be $250?
M r. Carter : Yes; assuming the highest rate for partner, the detail work
of auditing is usually done by a subordinate.59
S enator A dams : H ow much of a burden is this going to put on the
comparatively small com pany? You were speaking a while back of
the companies whose stocks are listed being independently audited. Now
com ing under the control of this bill are going to be thousands of small
companies putting out an issue for their original financing. How much of a
burden and cost is that going to put on them?
M r. Carter : Very little measured in value to the investor and to them.
Senator G ore : What would be the range?
Mr. C a rte r: My experience would be that the average com pany pays
around $500 or $600 or $700 for its auditing, that is, taking the large and
small together.
S enator G ore : H ow often do they resort to that?
M r . C arter: Every year. And the largest organizations of our country do
it and have been doing it for the last 15 years.
Senator G ore : Have had these independent audits made?
M r . Carter : Have had these independent audits made, yes.60

The hourly fees of auditors have increased about tenfold since
Carter’s 1933 estimate. Congress might have expected that auditors’
hourly rates would rise dramatically due to increased auditors’ respon
sibilities, which would necessarily lead to increased education require
ments, “ support” staff specialists, and legal costs and damages.
However, Congress could not have projected, from Carter’s testimony,
the hours required for audits of financial statements currently filed with
the SEC pursuant to either of the securities acts.61 Some senators
seemed skeptical at first of Carter’s low estimates of audit costs, but
the Senate committee did not insist that he explain his assumptions
more precisely. The Senate committee was apparently satisfied that
audit costs would be reasonable.
At the 1934 Senate hearings, May indicated that public companies
might have to pay very high annual audit fees:
M r . May : . . . We happen to be discussing the question with the Stand

59. 1933 Senate Hearings, pp. 60-61.
60. Ibid., p. 59.
61. Schneider and Manko, “Going Public: Practice, Procedure and Consequences,”
Villanova Law Review 15 (1970): 283 [reproduced in part in Wiesen, Regulating
Transactions in Securities, p. 48], made the following estimate of accounting fees for
a company “going public” : “ If there have been no prior audits and new accountants
are engaged at the time of the offering, fees in the $25,000 to $50,000 range, and
even higher, would not be unusual." The authors imply that the fee could not be
much less.

46

ard Oil Co. of New Jersey just now in regard to what an annual audit might
cost.
Senator Kean : What kind of a figure did you give them, if I may ask?
M r . M ay : I told them it was so enormous that we could not make any
commitment. But I should say an annual audit of the Standard Oil of New
Jersey would probably cost, with all its several hundred companies in
cluded, certainly a quarter of a million, possibly more.
S enator K ean : A quarter of a million dollars each time?
M r. May: Yes. That would be doing it the quickest possible way. It

would be doing it at the end of the year and not working on it all the way
through. . . .62

The conflict between the estimates by Carter and May of the cost
of annual audits can be explained by the respective purposes of their
testimony. Carter wanted to dissuade Congress from requiring federal
audits, and therefore he emphasized the low cost of independent
audits. May apparently did not want Congress to require annual audits,
and therefore he emphasized their high cost. The Senate committee’s
failure to question May in 1934 about Carter’s testimony the previous
year indicates a lack of congressional interest in auditing. However, by
not objecting to May’s assertion that audits might be performed “ the
quickest possible way,” the Senate committee displayed a concern
that audit costs be maintained at reasonable levels.

Estimating Income
Congress was informed at the 1934 House hearings that many
companies were closing their books on December 31, although it was
not the end of their “ natural year.” 63 At the 1934 Senate hearings, May
gave examples of more “ natural years” : September or October clos
ings for automobile and tire companies, October closings for packing
houses, and June closings for railroads.64
Since Congress did not require “ natural” closing dates, Congress
may have been willing to tolerate two effects on auditing. In the first
place, calendar year ends create staffing problems as discussed
above. Secondly, “ unnatural” closing dates magnify the problems of
matching revenues and expenses.

62. 1934 Senate Hearings, pp. 7182-83.
63. U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Hearings
on H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720, 73d Cong., 2d sess. (1934), p. 652. The statement was
made in a memorandum prepared by J. Harry Covington, counsel for the AIA.
64. 1934 Senate Hearings, p. 7186. The statement was made in a memorandum pre
pared by May.
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The Auditor’s Report
Cochrane describes the four changes in the auditor’s report
through 1933. The first report stated that the “ books” of the company
had been audited.65 After minor changes in a second report, the report
that took effect around 1931 stated that the “accounts” of the company
had been examined.66 The new report in 1933 stated that the “account
ing records” had been examined “or tested.” 67 Congress should have
expected that the auditor’s report would be changed, and its as
surances reduced, after the passage of the securities acts.

65. Cochrane, The Auditor’s Report, p. 449.
66. Ibid., p. 451.
67. Ibid., p. 453.
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Conclusion
An examination of congressional intent regarding auditors’ duties
under the securities acts produces little “ primary” evidence of con
gressional expectations. However, testimony at committee hearings
and published commentaries about the state of auditing in 1933-4
permits reasonable support for some conclusions. Such “ extrinsic”
evidence can be used to deduce what Congress meant to achieve in
the acts, because, as one legal research scholar recently wrote, “ . . .
American courts exclude almost no form of extrinsic aid in the inter
pretation of statutes.” 1
Some people have believed that Congress made a thorough study
of auditing in 1933-4. For example, the SEC stated in a 1958 release
that the 1933 Senate hearings “ considered at length the value to
investors and to the public of an audit by accountants not connected
with the company or management and whether the additional expense
to industry of an audit by independent accountants was justified by the
expected benefits to the public” (emphasis supplied).2 This study con
cludes that the securities acts were quite thoroughly conceived and
debated generally, but that the duties of auditors were not of great
interest to congressmen.
The securities acts were not adopted casually. The acts were
drafted by leading lawyers, who were able to refer to previous se
curities regulation bills that had been introduced into Congress, to
state “ Blue Sky” laws, and to the British Companies Act. Congressional
hearings considered the views of the draftsmen and of some of the
leading spokesmen of the accounting profession.
On the other hand, an analysis of the legislative history indicates a
lack of knowledge about auditing on the part of congressmen and less
than a vigorous interest in the topic when it was raised at hearings.
The 1933 proposal to have federal auditors was never advanced
beyond a preliminary consideration, and the creation of the SEC in
1.
2.

Sloane, “ Legal Research: Federal Legislative History,” New York Law Journal, De
cember 14, 1976, p. 4, col. 1.
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Independence of Certifying Accountants,
ASR no. 81 (December 11, 1958), p. 2.
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1934 appears to have been an extravagant substitution for profound
thinking about the duties of auditors.
The absence of careful consideration of auditors’ duties tends to
rebut the argument that Congress was placing heavy responsibilities
on auditors. Also supporting “ low” expectations of auditors’ duties was
testimony emphasizing the limitations of accounting and auditing, the
inadequate qualification standards for accountants in some states, and
the absence of a unified national association of accountants. The
statements of a spokesman of the accounting profession, which led to
the rejection of federal auditors, could promise little in independent
auditor services because of the insufficient thought which had been
given to the plans for federal auditors.
On the other hand, a “ high” degree of expectations could be
supported by the provisions of section 11 of the 1933 act, the creation
of the SEC in the 1934 act, the progress in auditing in the fifty years
prior to 1933-4, and the possibly high expectations of investors.
The SEC seems to apply the securities acts to auditors on the basis
of high congressional expectations. This may be justified by the broad
language in the acts delegating authority over auditing to the SEC, the
remedial purposes of the securities acts, the creation of the SEC itself,
and the absence of specific congressional intent regarding auditors’
duties. However, an application of the acts to auditors should be
bound by (a) specific congressional expectations of auditors and au
diting and (b) the requirement that statutes cannot be too vague.
Congressional intent regarding specific auditor services highlights
two themes. In the first place, Congress was particularly concerned
with the balance of responsibility between accountants and directors,
and between accountants, corporate managers, and underwriters, gen
erally. Secondly, Congress was aware of some of the limitations of
auditing, especially reliance on subordinates, the time and cost con
straints of audits, and variations in auditor and auditing firm compe
tence. Congress appeared to have an understanding of these inherent
problems of auditing if the silence of congressmen when told of these
problems at the hearings on the securities acts can be construed as
legislative intent.
Courts and the SEC seem to have adopted a flexible and expand
able approach to auditors’ responsibilities under the securities acts. A
House committee report accompanying the 1933 act bill may have
contemplated this approach: “The duty of care to discover varies in its
demand upon participants in the security distribution with the impor
tance of their place in the scheme of distribution and with the degree
of protection that the public has a right to expect” (emphasis sup
plied).3 Similarly, Landis, in a speech to accountants shortly after the
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U.S., Congress, House, H. Rep. 85, 73d Cong., 1st sess., 1933, p. 9.

1933 act was passed, referred to "the flexibilities inherent in the Act
and its capacities for adaptation to the complexities of the situations it
covers.” He went on to tell the audience that to understand the 1933
act, accountants should “[remember] always .. . that the public inter
est and the protection of investors must be the guiding consideration.”4
In 1939 the SEC’s chief accountant described this flexible approach
to interpretation of the securities acts as they affect accountants:
By statutory mandate, it is thus the duty of the Commission in each
problem it faces to keep in mind not only “What does the public investor
receive,” but also “What is the public investor entitled to expect." For
tunately, the Congress has invested the Commission with regulatory and
rule making powers designed to ensure that the answers to these two
questions shall not be unreasonably different.5

Not only the SEC, but the courts too, have interpreted the securities
acts to meet the changing expectations of the public, as seen in the
following statement by A. A. Sommer when he was an SEC commis
sioner:
It is clear that in very large measure the courts have shaped the respon
sibilities of the auditors and provided them with benchmarks against which
to measure their conduct because the auditors were slow in doing so
themselves in response to such “ surging” forces in society as a great
demand for disclosure, a greater involvement of the public in the securities
markets, more insistence upon disclosure reasonably understandable in
the marketplace, and more demanding definition of the role of the auditor
in this society.6

Court opinions, such as in the BarChris case, have appended
elaborate rules of conduct for auditors onto rather bare provisions of
the securities acts.7 According to Chatov, the accounting profession
has sought “flexibility” from the 1920s to the present in order to avoid
direct government control.
It is difficult to denote the limits to administrative agency and court
interpretation of statutes. Courts and agencies should ascertain legisla
tive intent when applying a statute. Agencies are limited in the creation
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(1933): 334.
W. W. Werntz, “What Is Expected of the Independent Auditor: From the Viewpoint of
the Investor,” an address delivered at the annual meeting of the American Institute
of Accountants September 21, 1939 (Washington, D.C.: Securities and Exchange
Commission), p. 1.
“The Legal Liability of the Accountant,” an address by Commissioner A. A. Sommer,
September 24, 1973, reprinted in Wiesen, Regulating Transactions in Securities (St.
Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1975), p. 279.
See Escott v. BarChris Construction Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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of rules by the requirement that the applicable statute be sufficiently
specific in its delegation of authority to the agency.
Only in rare cases has legislation been successfully attacked for
lacking specificity. Therefore, agencies and courts have been able to
create responsibilities that comport with the public’s expectations. Fur
thermore, the failure of Congress to object to an interpretation of its
legislation, such as the application of the securities acts to auditors,
provides some evidence of legislative intent.
Landis reported in his 1933 speech quoted above,
No m em ber of either House at any time voted against the passage of the
bill, nor took occasion to criticize any provision that the bill contained. . . . I
cite [this and other] facts merely as illustrative of a Congress with its
emotions unaroused but deeply conscious of the evils which unrestrained
exploitation of our capital resources had brought into existence.8

When Congress voted on the securities acts, the actual duties of
auditors must have seemed to be an area in which flexibility, reflecting
actual experience, would be appropriate. Congress thereby left pos
terity with the dilemma of placing proper limits on the application of the
securities acts to auditors.

8.
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J. M. Landis, “Liability Sections of Securities Act Authoritatively Discussed,’’ p. 330.

